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Abstract 
Using Nancy Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite model of justice as a theoretical backdrop, this 
thesis critically evaluates the United Nation’s (UN) International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), in relation to how this Tribunal has both secured and limited 
opportunities to ’do’ justice for sexual violence (SV) victims. This thesis applies a 
gendered approach to Fraser’s model, and considers how justice has been secured by 
women, based on principles of recognition, redistribution and representation. 
Using documentary methods, the thesis analyses ICTR cases concerning SV, to 
determine how this Tribunal has responded to SV committed against women and girls 
throughout the Rwandan genocide. This thesis demonstrates that, while the Tribunal has 
secured some level of justice for SV victims by successfully indicting, prosecuting and 
punishing some individuals responsible for SV, these crimes have been constructed and 
responded to in ad hoc and skewed ways. The analysis shows that crimes of SV, as well 
as its victims, are underrepresented in the ICTR. It also demonstrates that where SV has 
been addressed, the institutional culture and framework of this Tribunal has 
marginalised the voice of women, and allowed for discriminatory and insensitive court 
practices to permeate judicial proceedings. SV victims, who continue to struggle with 
redistributive injustices, have been negatively impacted by these ICTR practices. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Rwanda, a small country located in central Africa, is home to one of the most brutal and 
intensive killing campaigns to have occurred in the 20th century. History of ethnic 
tension between the Hutu and the Tutsi, the two main ethnic groups that occupy the 
region, can be traced back to the end of the Belgian colonial period in the 1950s. 
However, by the time Rwanda gained independence in 1962, a new cycle of ethnic 
violence began to emerge, accompanying the gradual shift in political power from the 
Tutsi community to that of the Hutu (United Nations (UN), 1996). From then on, 
tension between the two ethnic groups continued to worsen. When Hutu Rwandans 
gained full control of the government in 1963, violence escalated, forcing thousands of 
Tutsi to seek refuge in neighbouring countries (Valentino, 2004). During the winter of 
1963-64, the new Hutu Government instigated “a new wave of anti-Tutsi violence” 
causing the death of approximately 10,000 Tutsi (Valentino, 2004: 179). These events 
eventually led to the establishment of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (a political 
Tutsi organisation), who began to fight for equal recognition (UN, 1996). 
 
In August 1993, the RPF gained full recognition and was granted an equal share of 
political power under an internationally mediated peace agreement (UN, 1996). In spite 
of this, Hutu extremists devised their own solution and began plotting genocide. On 
April 6
th
, 1994, President Habyarimana died when his plane was shot down. Hutu 
extremists within his party immediately assumed power, and implemented a policy to 
annihilate the Tutsi and any moderate Hutu who supported them (Jones, 2004). 
Throughout a 100 day period, between April 6
th
 and July 16
th
, 1994, more than 800,000 
men, women and children were murdered within Rwanda
1
 (Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), 2003). 
 
After much delay
2
,
 
the UN recognised that effective measures needed to be 
implemented to prevent further violence. It also became apparent that more long-term 
legal measures needed to be considered to investigate the events that had already taken 
place, and to ensure those responsible for serious violations of international 
                                               
1 For a more detailed and comprehensive account of Rwandan history, and the lead up to the genocide, 
see Prunier (1995).  
2 An Independent Inquiry report noted that the UN failed to prevent, and subsequently stop the Rwandan 
genocide. This failure was attributed to limited UN resources and a lack of political will (Carlsson, Sung-
Joo & Kupolati, 1999). 
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humanitarian law (IHL) would be brought to justice (UN, 1996). In the wake of the 
genocide, the UN Secretary-General established an impartial Commission of Experts 
who were responsible for carrying out extensive investigations of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes (SC, 1994a). The main goal of the Commission was to 
establish the applicable norms of IHL which had been violated and determine individual 
culpability for these crimes. The Commission considered the practicability of bringing 
perpetrators to trial before a domestic or International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) (UN, 
1996). Following its investigations, the Commission recommended that the Security 
Council (SC) take effective measures to ensure that individuals responsible for 
violations of IHL would be brought to justice before an ICT (SC, 1994a: 2). Shortly 
thereafter, the SC established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
on November 8
th
, 1994, for the prosecution of those responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of IHL, committed between January 1
st
 and December 31
st
, 1994 (SC, 
1994b). 
 
The UN has - in the establishment of the ICTR - made considerable efforts to provide a 
sense of justice for those who have suffered violations of IHL in Rwanda. This thesis 
shows that this Tribunal has been successful in bringing high-ranking perpetrators to 
account, in addition to developing further international jurisprudence on human rights 
violations. However, the ICTR’s contributions to ‘justice’ have been quite ad hoc, 
especially when one considers how the ICTR has dealt with genocide survivors, 
particularly those who were subjected to gross acts of sexual violence (SV). 
 
Throughout the Rwandan genocide, violence took on gender-specific forms which set 
out to target men and women in very different ways. Men were primarily the victims of 
killings (Jones, 2004), whereas women were targeted in a campaign of mass SV
3
 
(HRW, 2003). SV was so widely used against females that the Organisation of African 
Unity (2000: Paragraph 16.20) concluded that “almost all females who survived the 
genocide were direct victims of rape or other SV, or were profoundly affected by it”. 
Degni-Segui’s (1996) report details that under-aged girls and elderly women were not 
spared, with those aged between 10 and 65 falling victim to SV. Heavily pregnant 
women were also raped, many of whom later miscarried or gave birth prematurely 
                                               
3 Throughout the genocide, Tutsi men and boys were also subjected to SV, although in far fewer numbers 
(see Brouwer, 2005: 13; Leavy, 2010: 46). 
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(Nowrojee, 1996). While the exact number of SV victims is not known, it is estimated 
that between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women and girls were subjected to rape, 
along with other forms of SV (Etchart & Baksh, 2005; HRW, 2003). 
 
Within the context of genocide, SV victims were also targeted on the basis of their 
ethnicity. SV was specifically used as a tool to “terrorise, dishonour, demoralise and 
divide the targeted [Tutsi] group” (African Rights & Redress, 2008: 86). Thus, Tutsi 
women and girls were the main victims of SV. The anti-Tutsi propaganda proved 
instrumental in encouraging SV against Tutsi women. Hutu propaganda portrayed Tutsi 
women as “enemy infiltrators” (Carpenter, 2008: 629), referring to them as “seductress 
spies” and “lethal serpents” (Flanders, 2000: 97). The Hutu Ten Commandments were 
one of the most obvious forms of propaganda, and the sexuality of Tutsi women was 
explicitly targeted in four out of ten of these commandments
4
 (see African Rights, 1995: 
42-43). However, moderate Hutu women also became the targets of SV, as well as Hutu 
women that were married to Tutsi men, protected Tutsi, or were politically affiliated 
with them (Brouwer, 2005). 
 
The forms of SV that took place were varied and included individual rape, gang rape, 
rape by incest, and rape with sticks, guns or other objects (Nowrojee, 1996). Sexual 
enslavement was also commonly documented, where victims were kept and raped for 
days or weeks in specifically designated ‘rape houses’, or in the homes of perpetrators 
(Coomaraswamy, 1998). SV also included instances of forced marriage, forced labour 
and sexual mutilation (Nowrojee, 1996). Sexual mutilation was particularly common: 
women’s labia were cut with machetes and other sharp objects, such as bottles, or 
sticks; hand-made, sharpened spears were inserted into their genitalia; their buttocks and 
breasts were commonly cut off; and, the uteri of some women were completely removed 
(Flanders, 2000). Nowrojee (1996) also detailed that, in one incident, acid was used to 
mutilate a woman’s sexual organs. In other cases, reports confirm that boiling water was 
used to scald victims’ vaginas (Jones, 2004). Many SV victims were also forced to 
undress and exposed to “public mockery” and sexual humiliation before being subjected 
to rape and other acts of SV (Degni-Segui, 1996: 8). 
                                               
4 For example, the first Hutu commandment stated that, “We shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who: 
marries a Tutsi woman, befriends a Tutsi woman, or employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a 
concubine” (African Rights, 1995: 42).  
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These brutal acts were perpetrated in public places, including, but not limited to, streets, 
roadblocks, churches, government offices, communal centres, refugee camp sites, 
hospitals and near to mass graves. SV was also perpetrated behind closed doors; in the 
homes of victims, in the homes of perpetrators, or in other private and secluded 
locations (Nowrojee, 1996). SV perpetrators were mainly members who belonged to the 
Interahamwe (the Hutu militia groups). However, SV was also perpetrated by soldiers 
of the Rwandan Armed Forces, including the Presidential Guard, and by other civilians 
(Brouwer, 2005). In some instances, soldiers and militia men forced men to rape their 
own daughters and wives (Nowrojee, 1996). Furthermore, military and political leaders, 
as well as heads of militia, directed, encouraged and condoned Hutu men to rape Tutsi 
women and girls to further their political goal: the destruction of the Tutsi as an ethnic 
group (HRW, 2004). 
 
SV was often committed in combination with other rights violations. Brouwer (2005), 
for example, noted that before the massacres took place, women and girls were 
specifically ‘put aside’ and subjected to SV, only to be murdered after these ordeals. 
The bodies of these victims were frequently left with their legs spread-eagled in public 
view, covered in semen and blood (Nowrojee, 2005). When Tutsi homes were raided, 
SV was commonly perpetrated in front of the victim’s family or after the victim had 
witnessed her family being murdered (Nowrojee, 1996). For example, Tutsi husbands 
and sons were frequently murdered first, before their female loved ones, who were later 
raped and tortured before being murdered (Degni-Segui, 1996). Thus the Special 
Rapporteur, working for the UN Commission of Human Rights, concluded that females 
“may be regarded as the main victims of the massacres, with good reason, since they 
were raped and massacred and subjected to other brutalities” (Degni-Segui, 1996: 6). 
 
For SV victims who survived these ordeals, their suffering continued. Many faced 
significant problems, including social stigmatisation, poor physical and psychological 
health, unwanted pregnancy and severe poverty (Nowrojee, 1996: 3). In many instances, 
SV victims were forced to cope with these challenges, along with the loss of family 
members, on their own (Brouwer, 2005). Like in many societies, SV carries a heavy 
burden of shame and social stigmatization in Rwanda (HRW, 2003). Consequently, SV 
victims were commonly viewed as tainted and un-marriageable. They faced rejection 
from their families, their loved ones and wider society. In some instances, victims were 
5 
 
even blamed for their assault and accused of collaborating with the enemy 
(Mukangendo, 2007). 
 
In the wake of SV, many victims also required urgent medical attention, as well as 
psychological care, which was largely unavailable (Brouwer, 2005). However, even 
when services were available, some victims were too afraid to access them due to the 
heavy burden of shame attached to SV (Amnesty International, 2004). Many victims 
were also faced with long term medical complications, especially in instances where 
they had been sexually mutilated or had contracted sexually transmitted diseases (HRW, 
2004). Amnesty International (2004) noted that the genocidal campaign of mass SV, 
perpetrated throughout the genocide, contributed significantly to the spread of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). In 2005, the Rwandan organisation Avega, tested 1,200 
SV victims for HIV, and discovered that two-thirds of these women had been infected 
with this deadly disease (Mcgreal, 2005). Men who were HIV positive both 
intentionally and unintentionally passed their disease onto their victims through rape 
(Mullins, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, the National Population Office of Rwanda estimated that between 2,000 
and 5,000 children were born from rape committed throughout the genocide, which 
caused significant difficulties for victims (Mukangendo, 2007: 40). Anti-abortion laws 
in Rwanda saw some victims attempt to abort these pregnancies on their own, resulting 
in further medical complications, and in some instances, even death (Amnesty 
International, 2004). Victims who went to full term were left to care for children born 
from rape (Nowrojee, 1996). These children were rejected from some mothers who 
labelled them “little Interahamwe” and “children of shame” (Degni-Segui, 1996: 9). 
Struggling with these difficulties, some women resorted to committing infanticide 
(Nowrojee, 1996). 
 
Other harms connected to SV have been further debilitating. Post-genocide, 70 percent 
of the surviving population was made up of females (Porter, 2007: 172). Thus many 
women and girls became the breadwinners of their families, while others were forced 
into ‘opportune marriages’ to regain economic stability. Many victims found it difficult 
to get work, particularly when they were faced with severe medical complications 
6 
 
following SV (Brouwer, 2005). Faced with these challenges, many SV victims went 
without food, healthcare, education and shelter following the genocide (HRW, 2004). 
 
Despite the widespread and systematic nature of SV that occurred during the Rwandan 
genocide, in combination with the long lasting effects and consequences of this 
violence, SV does not appear to have been a main concern for the UN’s ICTR (African 
Rights & Redress, 2008; Carpenter, 2008; Galina, 2010; Nowrojee, 2005). The ICTR’s 
primary focus has been geared towards investigating and prosecuting crimes of 
genocide and other rights violations, which has significantly limited the opportunities 
for SV victims to obtain legal ‘justice’. This thesis critically evaluates both the 
successes and shortcomings of this Tribunal, in relation to how it has responded to SV 
committed against women and girls throughout the Rwandan genocide. 
 
Legal Justice for Sexual Violence Victims 
Historically, SV was viewed as an inevitable and inconsequential aspect of conflict 
(Haffajee, 2006). International legal doctrines have rarely referred to SV and, in 
doctrines where SV has been mentioned, ICTs have largely failed to charge or sanction 
it (see Brouwer, 2005; Copelon, 1994; Levy, 1994; Niarchos, 1995). The press reports 
covering the former Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s, however, helped to expose SV 
as an issue that needed to be recognised and addressed (Sharlach, 2000). In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina alone, thousands of women and children were systematically raped and 
murdered in organised military ‘rape camps’ (Seifert, 1994). Following extensive 
documentation of these atrocities
5
, the UN was pressured into addressing SV as a crime 
of international proportions (Levy, 1994: 258). In 1993, the UN’s SC established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the prosecution of 
individuals who had committed violations of IHL in the Balkans. The UN’s SC declared 
that the "massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women...in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina" was a serious violation of IHL (SC, 1993: 1). In an effort to ensure 
that SV perpetrators did not evade criminal prosecution, rape was explicitly defined as a 
crime against humanity under Article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute (ICTY, 2009a: 6). 
Consequently, the ICTY became the first ICT to exclusively deal with crimes of SV 
(Institute for Women’s Policy and Research (IWPR), 2005). This allowed for the ICTY 
                                               
5 Galina (2010) argues that women’s groups and NGO’s have played an important part in exerting 
pressure on the UN, to respond to atrocities specifically directed at women and girls in conflict. 
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to make a number of landmark judgements wherein rape was recognised and 
successfully prosecuted as a crime against humanity, a war crime and as an act of 
genocide (ICTY, 2012). 
 
Following these feats, the UN has not only worked towards recognising SV in conflict 
within its wider framework, through passing multiple resolutions condemning such 
practices
6
, but has continued to define, prosecute and punish SV in other UN established 
ICTs. As this thesis demonstrates, ICTs have begun to build a progressive response to 
SV in conflict, and have created new opportunities for SV victims to obtain legal 
‘justice’. Nevertheless, ICTs have been heavily criticised for their reluctance to 
rigorously investigate and prosecute SV (Askin, 2005; Coomaraswamy, 2005; Galina, 
2010; Nowrojee, 2005). This can be seen when examining international trends which 
reveal that ICT indictments, containing SV charges, are still vastly underrepresented in 
comparison to other crimes
7
. In cases where SV has been pursued, international 
criminal justice processes and procedures have hindered participation, validation and 
acknowledgement of its victims (Henry, 2009). In particular, research demonstrates that 
ICTs have failed to respond to SV in a way that is sensitive to the gendered nature of 
this crime and the needs of its victims (Brouwer, 2005; Galina, 2010; Nowrojee, 2005; 
Sharratt, 2011). Askin (2005), for example, argues that a lack of gender expertise has 
meant that harmful stereotypes surrounding SV have shamed, re-victimised and silenced 
SV victims within ICT proceedings. Consequently, even when SV has been successfully 
prosecuted, the majority of its victims have been left dissatisfied with the outcome, and 
are commonly traumatised by their court experiences (Mertus, 2004; Sharratt, 2011). 
 
From these observations, it becomes paramount to consider how SV cases progress 
through ICTs, in order to understand the effectiveness of the international legal system. 
This thesis critically evaluates both the successes and shortcomings of the UN’s ICTR,  
in relation to how this Tribunal has responded to SV, and subsequently delivered justice 
to its victims. Learning more about how the UN’s ICTR has addressed SV in Rwanda is 
                                               
6 In 2000, the UN SC passed the first resolution concerned with the impact that armed conflict has on 
women. SC Resolution 1325 emphasized that it was the responsibility of all states to end impunity for 
war crimes, including SV against women and girls. Furthermore, it called upon all parties to take special 
measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in conflict (SC, 2000a). The UN SC has 
subsequently passed other relevant resolutions, including Resolution 1820 (SC, 2008), 1888 (SC, 2009a), 
1889 (SC, 2009b) and 1960 (SC, 2010). 
7 See for example, Askin (2005), Grewal (2010: 65-68), Nainar (2012) and Nowrojee (1996). 
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paramount given the ‘frame-setting’ nature of the UN as a whole. The UN helps 
“develop the rules, standards, laws and institutions that make orderly social life possible 
at the international level” (Barnett & Finnemore, 2007: 47). In this respect, the UN 
helps set the tone for international discussions, policies and practices towards SV. By 
examining UN responses to SV in conflict, one can gain a clearer picture of the 
international framework that has been employed, and attain a stronger understanding of 
the development that may still be required within this area of IHL. 
 
Before this discussion can proceed, it is necessary to establish the parameters of this 
thesis. Although SV is perpetrated against women, men and children in conflict, it 
affects women and girls disproportionately (Baksh & Etchart, 2005). Thus, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) (1995) recognised that women and girls 
are undoubtedly at greater risk of SV (an issue apparent in the Rwandan situation). 
Furthermore, they face significant gender-related barriers when seeking legal redress for 
crimes of SV in all national and international legal systems (BDPA, 1995). Therefore, 
this thesis critically evaluates the UN’s ICTR, in relation to how this Tribunal has both 
secured and limited opportunities to ’do’ justice for sexual violence (SV) victims 8. This 
thesis also defines SV as “any violence, physical or psychological, carried out through 
sexual means or by targeting sexuality” (McDougall, 1998: 7). The definition is 
deliberately broad, in an effort to capture the wide spectrum of sexually violent acts 
committed against females in conflict. This is important given that, as shown above, SV 
is not limited to rape; it includes a wide range of other harmful acts such as forced 
nudity, forced prostitution, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, forced impregnation and 
other harmful sexual acts. 
 
A Feminist Theoretical Approach 
This thesis employs a feminist theoretical approach to research in investigating how the 
UN’s ICTR has both secured and limited opportunities for SV victims to achieve 
‘justice’. Critically reflecting on the lived experiences of women is useful, as it helps 
inform one’s understanding of the social world (Letherby, 2003). Epstein (2007) 
                                               
8 While this thesis concerns SV committed against women and girls in conflict, it primarily considers how 
justice has been secured within ICTs for women. The reasons for this are that (i) children present a whole 
new range of vulnerabilities within the court room, and their experiences need to be addressed in that 
context (ii) SV witnesses before the ICTR were adults, thus the experiences of girls was limited within 
court processes. 
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observes that, globally, women hold a subordinate position to men and remain 
disadvantaged in social, economic and political aspects of life. In response, feminist 
research is primarily interested in producing knowledge that will help to transform 
gendered injustice and subordination (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 2002). Feminist 
researchers critically examine the status and treatment of women within the “sexist, 
male-stream and patriarchal” societal order, in the hope of exposing social practices that 
have “displaced, ignored and silenced women”, or resulted in an unequal and 
discriminating order (Sarantakos, 1998: 54). In this sense, research is not distinguished 
as being feminist on the sole basis that it investigates gender or gendered social lives, 
but because of the normative framework that it utilises (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 
2002). 
 
This thesis uses a broad theoretical framework that is directly focused on ‘justice’. 
Political philosopher, Nancy Fraser (2007a), believes that to achieve justice, social 
arrangements need to enable all individuals to participate on a par with others. Based on 
this presumption, Fraser (2007a) devised a theoretical model focused on three 
interlocking dimensions of justice: (i) recognition, which demonstrates the way socio-
cultural patterns of value impact upon how individuals are recognised; (ii) 
redistribution, which focuses on the way structural injustices, determined by status 
disparities, affect how individuals gain access to resources which enable them to 
participate on a par with others; and (iii) representation, which illustrates the way 
membership and procedural issues determine how individuals can pursue justice claims. 
 
Using Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite model of justice as a theoretical backdrop, this thesis 
critically evaluates the ICTR, in relation to how this Tribunal has both secured and 
limited opportunities to ’do’ justice for sexual violence (SV) victims. In her article 
Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition, Fraser (2007b) applied her theoretical 
approach to gendered justice, and examined the practical problems that arise when 
securing justice for women. However, her approach is more holistic, as it situated 
gender struggles for justice as one social differentiation among others (such as ‘race’, 
ethnicity, sexuality, religion or nationality) (Fraser, 2007b: 29). This thesis engages with 
Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite model in terms of how it relates the gendered framework of 
international criminal justice. In doing so, this thesis does not intend to downplay the 
importance of other status disparities, but rather seeks to provide a more comprehensive 
10 
 
understanding of the difficulties that women face in their pursuit for ‘justice’ for crimes 
of SV
9
. 
 
Some critics of feminist research have been sceptical of placing women at the helm of 
social inquiry (Letherby, 2003). Jones (2004: 126), for example, argues that any 
research project that focuses exclusively on women is likely to leave “a vast analytical 
terrain untouched or poorly explored”. He suggests that, while focusing on women and 
their experiences of conflict is important, if there are no gender-specific studies 
conducted on the experience of men in conflict, men’s experiences run the risk of being 
suppressed. However, feminist scholars advocate conducting isolated studies on women 
because most knowledge has been previously dominated by men, and focuses almost 
exclusively on men (Heidensohn & Gelsthorpe, 2007). Therefore, this thesis does not 
seek to actively suppress the experience of men as Jones (2004) suggests, but rather 
hopes to advance the current position of women, by bringing their previously neglected 
experiences to the foreground. 
 
Methodology  
The research for this thesis was undertaken using qualitative documentary analysis. 
Documentary analysis is defined by Jupp (2006: 41) as a “detailed examination of 
documents across a wide range of social practices”. He suggests that upon analysing a 
set of documents, a researcher will come to learn about a document’s authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning. Researchers carrying out documentary 
analysis, however, are most interested in the meaning and content of the documents 
examined (Yeboah, 2008). Scott (1990) indicates that the purpose of ‘doing’ 
documentary analysis is to come to some understanding of the meaning and significance 
of what the documents contain, and how this information enables a researcher to answer 
their research questions. 
 
The four key stages of documentary analysis, as identified by Sarantakos (1998), are: 
the identification of documents, the organisation and analysis of documents, the 
evaluation of the obtained information, and finally, the interpretation of the collected 
data. However, unlike other research methods, there is no clear methodological way to 
                                               
9 It is important to recognise, however, that status disparities often overlap which can result in further 
disadvantage when making justice claims (Fraser, 2007a). 
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‘do’ documentary research, as it encompasses a variety of different approaches to data 
analysis (Jupp, 2006). This thesis pursues an analysis that is focused upon: 
Manipulating the documents and studying the text in a very detailed and 
analytical way. More particularly, the text is read and conclusions are 
made on issues that are beyond the language (e.g. meaning, purpose, etc) 
in a qualitative or a quantitative manner. (Sarantakos, 1998: 207) 
 
This approach assumes that there is much to learn about the material items produced 
within culture. For example, it is understood that a researcher can “learn about social 
life, such as norms, values, socialisation, or other social stratification” by examining the 
texts that individuals and institutions produce (Leavy, 2007: 229). From a feminist 
perspective, employing these practices is particularly useful, as the texts and objects that 
groups of people produce often provide traces of the larger ideas these groups have, 
such as ideas related to gender (Leavy, 2007). Atkinson & Coffey (2004) note that 
studying institutional documents is particularly useful, as it enables a researcher to learn 
more about that organisation and how it operates. In particular, the documents that 
institutions produce are generally laden with its cultural values (Atkinson & Coffey, 
2004). This was significant given that this research was interested in determining how 
the UN’s ICTR has responded to SV victims in Rwanda, and whether the institutional 
and operational practices employed to address SV have accommodated women in their 
pursuit of justice. 
 
The principal aim of this thesis was to analyse the documents in a qualitative manner 
(although this thesis does employs some simple quantitative analysis). This qualitative 
approach allowed for the development of a more informed and critical understanding of 
how the UN’s ICTR has managed its discourse on SV, and responded to its victims 
within the justice process. The following section will detail how these methods were 
undertaken. 
 
Research Methods 
The data informing this research was collected from completed ICTR cases that contain 
references to SV. The following sections detail how this research was approached in 
relation to Sarantakos’ (1998) stages of documentary analysis mentioned above. 
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Identifying Relevant Documents 
In order to access completed ICTR cases, I used the online database available on the 
ICTR website (http://www.unictr.org). This website gave me access to the indictments, 
trial chamber judgements, sentences and appeal chamber decisions for each case. In 
order to identify cases containing references to SV, I downloaded all applicable 
documents for all 43 completed cases, and then searched through each individual 
document. To speed up the process, I created ‘search words’ that were entered into the 
Full Reader Search of the Adobe Reader Software Programme (which was used to view 
each legal document downloaded). The search words used were explicitly related to 
sexually violent acts, such as ‘SV’, ‘rape’, ‘sex’, ‘sexual’, ‘sexual assault’, ‘sexualised 
violence’, ‘genital mutilation’, ‘sexual mutilation’, ‘forced nudity’ and ‘sexual slavery’. 
However, this process was not as straight forward as initially thought, as the ICTR 
database only contained the most recent documents for each case. For example, if SV 
charges were included in the ‘original indictment’, but were subsequently dropped, they 
would not be included in the ‘amended indictment’ (the only indictment made 
available). Therefore, cases originally containing SV charges could be easily missed. To 
remedy this problem, I obtained access to the Jurisprudence Library (ICTRcaselaw.org), 
which contained all required documents. Of the 43 cases examined, a total of 25 contain 
references to SV committed against Rwandan women and girls, of which 23 formed the 
basis of this research (see Appendix I & II). At the time of writing, 17 additional cases 
were awaiting appeal. These cases were not included in this research. 
 
Organising and Analysing Documents 
The indictments, trial chamber judgements and appeal chamber decisions of each of the 
23 identified cases were used throughout the organisation and analysis stages of 
research. However, the trial and appeal judgements have dominated this analysis, as 
they provide a detailed description of the SV allegations, the applicable elements of law 
and the Chamber’s subsequent legal decisions. In order to make this research 
manageable
10
, I wrote case summaries for each of the 23 cases. After noting various 
themes relating to the outcome of each case, I organised the cases into five categories: 
(i) cases where successful convictions have been entered for SV crimes; (ii) cases where 
SV convictions have been overturned on appeal; (iii) cases where individuals have been 
                                               
10 Some documents were over 800 pages in length. 
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acquitted of SV charges; (iv) cases where SV charges have been dropped or 
subsequently withdrawn; and, (v) other relevant cases. I then developed a table which 
indicates how acts of SV have been prosecuted in the ICTR crimes process (see 
Appendix I). This table can be used as a quick ‘go to’ reference detailing the outcome of 
each case. 
 
When using quantitative content analysis to review each case, I documented the 
following: the number of adjudicated cases originally containing SV charges; the 
number of cases that dropped SV charges before making it to court; the number of 
successful convictions pertaining to SV charges; the number of cases that contain SV 
acts that underpinned convictions for other crimes; the number of unsuccessful 
convictions pertaining to SV charges; and, the number of convictions concerning SV 
that had been overturned on appeal. These figures form a quantitative record indicating 
how crimes of SV has been recognised and prosecuted within the ICTR crimes process. 
These results are presented in Chapter Four. 
 
The main body of information was obtained by examining the selected documents in a 
qualitative manner. When using qualitative documentary analysis, I looked for specific 
themes related to how the ICTR had secured or limited justice for SV claimants. These 
themes were constructed from the ‘ground up’, after conducting the literature review 
and reading through each case. They were also informed by Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite 
model of justice, based on principles of recognition, redistribution and representation. 
 
The main themes that have guided this qualitative analysis are: 
 
 Case Outcomes Pertaining to SV Allegations 
In cases that secured successful outcomes concerning SV and/or related charges, I 
documented the Chamber’s legal findings. In particular, I recorded the applicable 
elements of the law that had been applied, and the important SV rulings concerning how 
these acts had been prosecuted. I also explored how SV had been prosecuted, either as 
crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes. If cases resulted in unsuccessful 
outcomes, I documented the reasons why, such as burden or lack of evidence, defective 
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indictments, or failure to link those accused to the alleged crimes. I also documented 
cases where the Prosecution had failed to appeal unsuccessful SV convictions. 
 
 The Differential Construction of SV Within the Legal Framework of the ICTR 
I gathered information concerning how SV had been defined, documenting how these 
conceptual definitions varied across and between cases. Similar patterns quickly 
emerged, where conceptual definitional frameworks of SV focused on: consent versus 
coercion; mechanical versus non-mechanical definitions of rape and SV; and, broad 
versus narrow interpretations of SV. When documenting these trends, I also looked at 
the Tribunal’s explanations for why differential definitions had been adopted. However, 
Chamber decisions were not only informed by ICTR cases; they included and referred 
to judgements made in the ICTY. Therefore, I reviewed ICTY cases that had applied the 
definitional frameworks that had later been employed by the ICTR. 
 
 Re-Victimisation and Insensitive Court Practices  
As indicated above, the literature demonstrates that ICTs have failed to address SV in a 
way that is sensitive to the gendered nature of this crime and to the needs of its victims. 
Therefore, this theme was pursued to determine whether the documents indicated mis-
treatment of SV victims, or that insensitive court processes and procedures were used. 
In particular, I noted the questions that women were asked by the Tribunal staff on 
cross-examination, and the appropriateness of them. I also documented the questions 
asked on cross-examination that required women to conform to the mechanical nature of 
rape (which sometimes involved an intimate description of body parts), or answer 
questions regarding the non-consensual aspects of these crimes.  The prevalence of rape 
myths within judicial proceedings was also considered, in order to understand more 
about the institutional and cultural framework of the ICTR. 
 
 The Adversarial Court System and Silencing of SV Victims  
This theme focused on how women had been silenced within the ICTR, as a result of 
the way the adversarial court system operates. Henry (2009), for example, observed that 
the adversarial court system operates as a fact-finder and does not always allow women 
to share their personal narratives in the way they desire. Therefore, I carefully explored 
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how women’s testimonies had been silenced or interrupted; documenting, for example, 
instances where the ICTR concentrated on proving ‘hard legal facts’, as opposed to 
letting the victim express her account in her own words. 
 
Evaluation and Interpretation of the Data 
As a theoretically-driven project, the evaluation and interpretation stages of research 
owe much to Fraser’s (2007a) model of justice based on recognition, redistribution and 
representation. These dimensions of justice ultimately determined how I evaluated and 
interpreted my research findings. My methodological approach, however, skewed the 
nature of the findings in favour of issues concerned with recognition. As demonstrated 
in the following chapters, representation and redistributive aspects of justice are closely 
related to the social and structural context in which justice claims are made. Therefore, 
most findings were centred on themes related to securing and limiting recognition 
within the ICTR crimes process. While the ICTR documents did provide some insight 
into issues associated with representation, they provided virtually no information on 
redistribution. Realising this limitation, I looked to the wider literature on the ICTR, and 
extracted information from reports and publications concerning the ICTR. I then 
correlated my research findings with the broader literature, in order to give meaning to 
the debate on how justice has been secured or limited for SV victims. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter Two explores the phenomenon of SV in conflict. The chapter begins by 
acknowledging that the ‘issue’ of SV committed against women and girls in conflict has 
been ignored by academia, in spite of its prominence throughout history. 
Acknowledging this neglect, the chapter provides a conceptual backdrop to SV 
committed against females during conflict, exploring its causes, functions and 
consequences. In doing so, SV is framed as a ‘problem’ that requires recognition in 
international justice mechanisms. The chapter then introduces Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite 
model of justice based on the: socio-cultural dimension of recognition; the economic 
dimension of distribution; and the political dimension of representation.  
 
Chapter Three critically engages with Fraser’s (2007a) model in relation to gendered 
injustice, focusing on how justice can be secured for SV victims in international justice 
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mechanisms. More specifically, the chapter considers the broader feminist literature on 
international legal justice and critically explores how the UN ICTs have both secured 
and limited opportunities for women, who have suffered SV, to attain justice. In doing 
so, Chapter Three creates a backdrop for how SV cases have been judged in the ICTR.  
 
Chapter Four presents the research findings that illustrate how justice has been secured 
and limited for SV victims within the ICTR. These findings are correlated with the 
broader literature on this Tribunal. The chapter acknowledges that the ICTR has 
facilitated justice for SV victims by successfully defining, prosecuting and punishing 
SV, but observes that crimes of SV have been constructed and responded to in ad hoc 
and skewed ways. Chapter Four reveals that problems with the institutional framework, 
institutional incapacities and participation limit and, in some cases, undermine positive 
practices of recognition. Furthermore, the chapter details that this Tribunal has largely 
failed to address concerns related to redistribution, which has negatively impacted on 
how justice is experienced by SV victims. 
 
Chapter Five critically discusses these findings, in relation to the main features of 
Fraser’s (2007a) theoretical framework and the findings from the wider literature. This 
chapter argues that while the ICTR may have facilitated some recognition for SV 
victims, it has failed to build an organisational culture and framework where SV has 
been systematically addressed and rigorously prosecuted. The outcomes of cases tended 
to be a product of individual prosecutorial decision-making, rather than a structured 
response to SV. 
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Chapter Two: Justice for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 
Victims 
During the Twentieth and Twenty First centuries, violence during conflict has moved 
away from the ‘battlefield’ and further into the community (Etchart & Baksh, 2005). 
Consequently, civilian populations are now considered to be more likely among those 
counted as human casualties of conflict (see Cairns, 1997). In addition, women and 
children (and some men) have become increasingly vulnerable to SV in conflict (Etchart 
& Baksh, 2005; Mullins, 2009; Reilly, 2007). However, the occurrence of SV in 
conflict is by no means a ‘new phenomenon’. 
 
History reveals that the ancient Greek, Persian and Roman troops routinely raped the 
women of their conquered enemies; and during the Crusades, knights and pilgrims, who 
were supposedly bound by vows of chivalry and Christian holiness, raped women 
(Siegel, 2011). In the Seventeenth Century, Spanish troops committed countless 
numbers of rapes against women in the Netherlands (Estep, 1986). During WWII, 
thousands of women were forced into prostitution and routinely raped by men serving in 
the Japanese military (Yoshimi & O’Brien, 2000), while Russian soldiers raped 
thousands of German women in Berlin at the end of WWII (Goldstein, 2001). 
Furthermore, in 1992, 20,000 Muslim and Croatian women and children were raped in 
specifically designated ‘rape camps’ in Bosnia (Seifert, 1994); and, at the time of 
writing, sexual brutalities against women and girls were being committed by 
government forces and pro-government militia during house raids, in Syria (Sherlock, 
2012). These examples demonstrate that SV in conflict has occurred in different times, 
spaces and societies, thus making it a key element of conflict and war making making 
activity
11
. 
 
Yet, despite its prominence, SV in conflict has been one of history’s greatest silences 
(Copelon, 1994). For centuries, SV was very simply regarded as an inevitable by-
product of conflict (Goldstein, 2001). Thus SV became an accepted norm and a 
tolerated feature of the ‘spoils of war’ (MacKinnon, 1994). While other aspects of 
conflict have received detailed consideration, academic scholarship dedicated to 
exploring the complex causes and consequences of SV was nonexistent up until the 
                                               
11 For a detailed history of SV committed in conflict, see Heineman (2011).  
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1970s. It is only in the past three decades that scholars have begun to acknowledge SV 
in conflict as an area worthy of critical academic investigation. 
 
Developing a theoretical and conceptual backdrop to SV in conflict has proven 
extremely valuable, mainly because it has helped to secure a place for SV on the 
international legal agenda. Given that women and girls are at an increased risk of SV, 
and present the majority of its victims (Brouwer, 2005), this chapter attempts to unearth 
some of the important theoretical contentions concerning the causes and functions of 
SV against females. The meanings given to SV in conflict are important to consider, 
because they help contextualise why SV is such an effective ‘weapon of warfare’. 
However, this chapter will also discuss some of the consequences SV has for its victims 
in order to highlight the seriousness of this violation. In light of these observations, this 
chapter works towards establishing the importance of addressing SV in international 
legal mechanisms. Therefore, the last section considers how justice might be secured by 
SV victims, based on Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite model of justice. 
 
The Causes and Functions of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
SV in conflict first made its way onto the academic agenda in the late 1970s, when 
Susan Brownmiller (1975) pioneered research on the politics of SV. She famously 
declared that “rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of fear” (Brownmiller, 1975: 5). Rejecting 
previous theories which saw SV as a problem of abnormal irrationality and individual 
pathology (see Rada, 1978), or theories grounded in the assumption that SV resulted 
from oversexed men (see Thornhill & Palmer, 2000), Brownmiller (1975) argued that 
SV could be explained by examining the highly political social structures of society. 
She claimed that SV had deep patriarchal
12
 roots, and was used to reinforce the unequal 
position between men and women, both in times of peace, and in times of conflict. 
Despite heavy criticism
13, Brownmiller’s (1975) work mobilised feminist thought into 
                                               
12 Patriarchy is a hierarchical order of dominance, whereby men hold elite power over women and 
children (McCann & Kim, 2002: 221).  
13 Although acknowledging Brownmiller (1975) for her innovative work on rape, Dubinsky (1993: 135) 
criticised that she failed to adequately address the complex relationship that exists between social 
structures and ideologies that support conditions for patriarchal dominance. In particular, she argued that 
Brownmiller’s (1975) conceptualisation of rape relied too heavily on “an ahistorical and essentialist 
conception of ‘all women’s’ and ‘all men’s experience”. Furthermore, Davis (1983: 177) argued that 
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acknowledging SV in conflict as an area of concern that needed further academic 
consideration. Since Brownmiller, many other feminists have begun to unpack the 
apparent social causes of SV, which can be used to explain the gendered nature of this 
phenomenon. 
 
Etchart & Baksh (2005) state that SV committed against females in conflict can be 
understood by examining forms of gender-based violence that exist in society more 
broadly. They note that, although gender-based violence is not limited to females, 
women and girls are most vulnerable and represent the majority of its victims. Like 
Brownmiller (1975), they argue that the dominant social order has characterised women 
as subordinate to men, and this power imbalance has worked to sustain discriminatory 
practices which have condoned violence against women. For example, cultural practices 
such as wife battery, honour killings and genital mutilation have functioned to maintain 
the ‘status quo’, whereby men have exerted social control over women’s lives (Baksh & 
Etchart, 2005). 
 
Leatherman (2011) explains the significance of these assertions, and details that these 
discriminatory practices are the social by-products of dominant or hegemonic forms of 
masculinity that attribute greater significance to men. For example, the practice of 
genital mutilation has worked to ensure that young girls remain chaste and pure until 
marriage, values of which are desirable and important to men. Other cultural practices, 
such as honour killings, have been carried out as a form of social discipline, whereby 
husbands and male family members have assumed the right to murder women who have 
committed adultery and other prohibited societal acts (Leatherman, 2011). She asserts 
that such practices have required a significant investment of time, social organisation 
and resources, and that SV committed against females in conflict can be seen in the 
same way. After all, such practices do not develop in isolation, but rather they derive 
from and feed off “pre-existing socioeconomic and culturally shaped gender 
relationships” (Leatherman, 2011: 3). In other words, females become prime targets for 
SV in conflict because of systemic patterns of gender subordination that exist within 
society generally. Through the enactment of these discriminatory practices, men have 
                                                                                                                                         
Brownmiller’s (1975) work supported the racial myth that black men are “especially prone to commit acts 
of violence against women”. 
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been able to maintain the established hierarchy of unequal gender relations, 
subsequently safeguarding their superiority. 
 
Although patterns of gender inequality vary between cultures, all women experience 
gender inequality across social, economic and political aspects of life to some degree. 
Gardam (2005: 119) claims that “nowhere are women full participants in society”. UN 
Women (2011) note that globally, women are still underrepresented in leadership and 
participation roles in the political sphere. By mid-2011, only 28 countries could declare 
that women’s parliamentary representation had reached 30 percent (UN Women, 2011: 
10). Economically, women still have limited access to economic assets, employment 
opportunities and positions of leadership. In particular, global patterns reveal that 50 
percent of the world’s women are in poorly paid and unstable employment, with the 
gender wage gap averaging between 10 and 30 percent (UN Women, 2011: 12). 
Women’s lack of economic stability means that they are more likely to live in 
conditions of poverty
14
. Consequently, access to adequate housing, food, health care and 
education is largely unavailable (see Epstein, 2007). The hardships suffered by women 
in conflict are linked to these deep socio-structural inequalities (Colombini, 2002). 
However, as identified below, these structural disadvantages also limit how women gain 
access to ‘justice’ in the aftermath of SV. 
 
However, whatever the cause of SV against females in conflict, SV arises from 
“different specific motivations in various wars” (Goldstein, 2001: 362). In other words, 
SV has no function that is necessarily common to all times and societies. Its functions 
ultimately depend on the historical, social and cultural context of the conflict in 
question, and must be discussed with reference to concrete cases (Seifert, 1994: 57). For 
instance, Sharlach (2000) argues that SV in conflict has been employed as an act of 
revenge against the enemy side - a motive evident in the rape of German women by 
Russian soldiers at the end of WWII (Goldstein, 2001). In other instances, SV has 
provided a service to the military. For example, throughout WWII, Japan developed a 
system of ‘comfort women’ where between 50,000 and 200,000 women were forced 
into sexual slavery to provide sexual services to the Japanese Army (Yoshimi & 
O’Brien, 2000). 
                                               
14 UN Women (2012) revealed that of the 1.5 billion people in this world living on less than $1 a day, 70 
percent are women. 
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SV has also been employed as an element of torture, which commonly functions to 
incapacitate ‘threatening’ communities (Stanley, 2009). For example, during the 
Cambodian genocide (1975-1979), female prisoners were tortured and raped in 
detention centres established under the Khmer Rouge regime (see Kissi, 2006). A more 
recent example has been documented in the ongoing Syrian conflict, where SV has been 
used to torture women accused of having political connections with the Syrian rebels 
(see Sherlock, 2012). Scholars also argue that SV in conflict can function as an element 
of male communication (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Brownmiller, 1975; MacKinnon, 2006; 
Seifert, 1994). Brownmiller (1975) first applied this notion to the ancient Greek 
warriors, who routinely raped the women of their conquered enemies. She explained 
that rape did not carry dishonour for Greek warriors because women of the losing side 
became ‘legitimate booty’ for the victors. In this context, SV was used to reinforce the 
enemy’s inability to protect ‘their’ women, and their masculinity was thus compromised 
(Brownmiller, 1975). Baaz & Stern (2009) took Brownmiller’s (1975) analysis further, 
suggesting that SV in conflict is often regarded as a symbolic message of domination to 
both the men, who are unable to prevent the abuse, and to the women, who become 
victims. 
 
Other scholars, like Goldstein (2001), have argued that the use of SV as an instrument 
of control and domination has significantly increased since the 1990s. He claims that 
modern methods of conflict explicitly target women and use “organised sexual assault 
as a tactic in terrorising and humiliating a civilian population” (Goldstein, 2001: 363). 
In support, Etchart & Baksh (2005) assert that conflict is now commonly fought through 
women’s bodies. This strategy is effective because women hold important cultural 
positions and are often considered central to the family structure within society (Seifert, 
1994). In particular, women play a major role “in building and preserving the clan-
based, ethnic, or cultural identity of any society” due to their sexual and reproductive 
abilities (Josse, 2010: 178). In this regard, systematic SV is an effective tool which 
demonstrates the power of the military, and subdues and humiliates an entire enemy 
population (Goldstein, 2001). For example, under the rule of Libyan Dictator Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi, troops were ordered and instructed to rape women as a means of 
subjugating the civilian population (Hall, 2012). Hall (2012: 1) noted that condoms and 
Viagra were provided to the troops to “encourage their assaults”. Widespread and 
systematic SV committed against women in conflict has also been documented 
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throughout areas of Liberia (HRW, 2002), Sierra Leone (Baldi & MacKenzie, 2007), 
Uganda (Webber & Rone, 2003), Haiti (Coomaraswamy, 2005), Guinea (Sillah, 2009), 
Syria (Sherlock, 2012) and Burma (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), 
2011), among others. 
 
Another perspective, which has gained significant attention in recent years, and is 
closely related to these themes, suggests that SV can be tactically adopted, and 
consciously employed, with the intent to destroy a group (Coomaraswamy, 2005; 
MacKinnon, 1994; Mullins, 2009; Sharlach, 2000). More specifically, Mullins (2009: 
18) contends that rape constitutes genocide when it is systematically: 
Used to generate fear in subdued populations, humiliate the population (both 
men and women), derogate women (through spoilage of identity), and create 
a cohort of mixed ethnic children to maintain the humiliation/ spoilage/ 
domination. 
 
The systematic practice of SV was a key part of the wider ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign 
committed against the Croatian and Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Sharlach, 2000). Of the 100 concentration camps run by the Serbian forces, 20 were for 
the sole purpose of raping and killing Croatian and Muslim women and girls 
(MacKinnon, 1994: 61). Over 30,000 Croatian and Muslim females were forcibly 
impregnated through mass rape within these camps (MacKinnon, 1994). Pregnant 
women were even segregated from other women, and detained until their seventh month 
of pregnancy, so that abortion was no longer possible (Niarchos, 1995). In this context, 
rape carried a very specific function, as victims were frequently told they were being 
impregnated in order to create ‘Chetnik babies’ (MacKinnon, 1994). 
 
This scholarship demonstrates the effectiveness of SV in conflict, in addition to the 
many functions that SV has. It shows that SV is commonly used against females as a 
strategic and orchestrated attack against the whole community. However, this 
discussion also identifies that the cause of SV can be inextricably linked to female 
subordination. These contentions are important to consider given that patterns of gender 
discrimination and subordination also limit women’s opportunities to attain justice in 
the aftermath of SV. The next section discusses the consequences of SV, in order to 
highlight why it is vital that international legal justice mechanisms respond to such 
crimes. 
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The Consequences of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
SV in conflict has devastating and wide-ranging consequences for its victims. In the 
wake of their violation, victims may face emotional and psychological trauma, physical 
injuries, the threat of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy 
(Mukangendo, 2007). These consequences are further intensified, given that the social 
stigma surrounding SV can work to silence victims, leaving them to cope with the 
aftermath of such violence on their own. SV victims are commonly treated as tainted, 
dishonoured or unmarriageable (Askin, 2005), and are thus, marginalised by their 
families and the wider community (Josse, 2010). In some societies, the shame that SV 
brings to a family is so severe that victims may be at risk of honour killing (Baksh & 
Etchart, 2005; Leatherman, 2011). Furthermore, Individuals who have suffered SV are 
rarely viewed as victims, and often encounter attitudes of hostility and abandonment 
(Mukangendo, 2007). This can lead them to feel isolated and, in some cases, they may 
develop feelings of guilt and self-blame (Colombini, 2002). 
 
The psychological implications for SV victims are also readily apparent. Folnegovic-
Smalc (1994: 177) reveals that many victims suffer from depression, anxiety, agitation, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, low self-confidence, apathy, sleep disorders, and many 
other psychological issues. Research also demonstrates that some women struggle to 
resume sexual relationships with their husbands and partners, or have difficulty 
establishing new relationships because of psychological trauma (Colombini, 2002). 
Some victims can also develop avoidance behaviour to escape things that bring back the 
memories of the abuse. This type of behaviour disrupts a victim’s day to day 
functioning, rendering her incapable of maintaining a normal and healthy lifestyle, 
where she is able to care for her family, or return to work (Josse, 2010). Moreover, the 
onset of physical health problems, such as vaginal discharge or pelvic pain, can cause 
psychological distress. Such conditions can make a victim ‘feel dirty’ and infected 
(Heise, Putanguy & Germain, 1994). Folnegovic-Smalc (1994) argues that SV 
committed in conflict intensifies the psychological symptoms suffered, as the trauma is 
multi-layered on the basis that many women have not only suffered SV, but also the 
loss of their loved ones, their home, material goods and the means for their survival. 
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Many victims also sustain severe physical injuries after SV; particularly those who have 
been subjected to sexual mutilation, gang rape, rape by objects, or repeated rape 
(Leatherman, 2011). The immediate psychical injuries associated with rape can include 
fistula, gynaecological, rectal and internal haemorrhaging (Clifford, 2008). However, in 
sexual attacks victims may also sustain other related injuries including broken bones, 
wounds and blunt trauma to the body (Nowrojee, 1996). More long term physical 
injuries can remain with some victims. In cases where women have been sexually 
mutilated, or where they have suffered other severe medical injuries, they may be 
unable to conceive children (Brouwer, 2005). This can also have wider sociological 
implications, as women who are incapable of bearing children can be further 
stigmatised, due to their failure to fulfil their social role of motherhood (Chinkin, 1994). 
Other health problems attributed to the transfer of sexually transmitted diseases can 
dramatically impact on victims lives, especially when victims have limited access to 
required medication (see Amnesty International, 2004). 
 
Women who bear children to rape face further difficulties. As detailed previously, in 
relation to Rwanda, some women feel they have no option but to self-abort, often in 
unsterile and unsafe conditions. This can result in infection, scarring, sterilisation and 
death (Clifford, 2008). Mothers who carry to full term often reject their children as they 
are seen as evidence of their ‘shameful’ experience (Mukangendo, 2007). However, the 
consequences of such violence are not isolated to SV victims. Children born from rape 
not only face rejection from their mothers, but also risk being stigmatised by the wider 
community (see Mukangendo, 2007).  
 
In the wake of SV, women also face other connected consequences related to work, 
housing and education (see Brouwer, 2005). These difficulties are often intensified as a 
result of women’s subordination and devaluation in society as a whole (McDougall, 
1998). However, SV not only affects those personally victimised, but has wider 
implications for their families, friends and wider communities. It functions to break 
down the social links that bind society together (Colombini, 2010). After all, rape 
centred within a community threatens the “well-being and secure existence of the entire 
community” (Chinkin, 1994: 329). 
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Yet, despite the severity and often long lived consequences of SV, it has received 
minimal recognition within the international legal framework. This contributes further 
to the suffering of SV victims. As this thesis demonstrates, the opportunity to attain 
legal justice - via forms of recognition, compensation and other forms of redistributive 
redress - is markedly limited for most victims. Therefore, it is important that 
institutional responses to SV work to ‘undo’ these harms, by recognising, and 
responding to, the concerns of these victims. In order to evaluate how international legal 
bodies have secured and/or limited justice opportunities for SV victims, the next section 
will discuss how justice might be secured by women who have suffered SV. 
 
Sexual Violence Victims and their Pursuit for Justice 
Stanley (2009: 35) recognises that many victims who have suffered human rights 
violations seek a complex form of justice: one which recognises their suffering, their 
social needs, as well as one which places them as participants in social mechanisms 
established to provide redress. Fitting this observation, this chapter will now consider 
how Fraser’s (2007a) model of justice, based on three interlocking dimensions of 
justice: the socio-cultural dimension of recognition; the economic dimension of 
distribution; and, the political dimension of representation, might be applied to SV 
victims. Fraser’s (2007a: 20) model is grounded in the assumption that in order to 
achieve justice, social arrangements need to enable all individuals to participate as “full 
partners in social interaction”. In theory, institutions should be designed and 
subsequently monitored to ensure that they are delivering justice in a way that benefits 
all individuals equally (Freeman, 1999). 
 
As above, SV in conflict disproportionately affects females (Baksh & Etchart, 2005). At 
the same time, ‘status disparities’ marked by gender can affect how women go about 
accessing justice, or making justice claims. Therefore, this section critically engages 
with Fraser’s (2007a) theoretical model in terms of how it relates to gender and 
gendered injustice. In applying such a restrictive approach, I do not intend to downplay 
other status disparities, but hope to provide a more informed analysis of how justice 
might be approached from a gendered point of view. 
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Recognition 
Under her socio-cultural based model of justice, Fraser (2007) argues that some 
individuals are prevented from participating on a par with others due to institutionalised 
hierarchies and patterns of cultural value. When patterns of socio-cultural value deny 
requisite standing to particular individuals, they suffer from what Fraser (2007a: 20) 
referred to as ‘misrecognition’ or ‘status inequality’. Fraser (2007a: 26) understands 
gender as a status of differentiation that is deeply rooted within the order of society. 
Within this status order, she argues that gender pervasively shapes socio-cultural 
patterns of value, which can limit ‘participatory parity’ in institutions designed to 
deliver justice. On a societal level, men have held an elite ‘status’ position over women, 
because powerful gender ideologies have held women in a subordinated societal 
position (Charlton, Everett & Staudt, 1989). 
 
As discussed above, systemic gender discrimination has ensured that women have been 
denied equal social, economic and political standing in comparison to their male 
counterparts. Furthermore, gendered hierarchies of cultural worth have helped to sustain 
social practices, whereby men have exerted power and social control over women, and 
subsequently devalued them in the process. According to Fraser (2007b), social 
institutions designed to deliver justice regularly mirror socio-cultural values of worth, 
meaning women are often regarded as inferior, excluded or are rendered invisible within 
social interactions. Therefore, the main feature of gendered injustice - in terms of 
recognition - is androcentrism, which Fraser (2007b: 26) defines as “an institutionalised 
pattern of cultural value that privileges traits associated with masculinity”. Androcentric 
cultural values impact negatively on women’s lives because men’s interests take 
priority. 
 
In support of these contentions, and directly applying them to the focus of international 
legal justice, Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright (1991) argue that because women have 
been excluded from leadership and important decision making roles in state and 
international organisations, androcentric thinking has dominated international legal 
discourse. They applied this contention to the UN human rights treaty system, where 
men’s experiences have become the un-named, universal norm on which human rights 
are based (Charlesworth et al., 1991). This is highly problematic, as laws which take 
men’s experiences as the norm, will be less likely to adequately protect or recognise the 
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experiences of women (Charlesworth & Gardam, 2000). In this vein, SV has received 
little recognition within the framework of IHL, because socio-cultural patterns of value 
have placed men’s experiences at the forefront of international legal doctrines. 
 
Coomaraswamy (2005), for example, suggests that because SV has been regarded as a 
necessary and inevitable consequence of conflict, SV committed against women has 
been ignored by historians, and by those involved in developing and implementing 
international legal norms. She argues that patriarchal understandings of SV, as well as 
the absence or invisibility of women in the international legal system, resulted in SV 
being neglected (Coomaraswamy, 2005: 58). Similarly, Ni Aolain, Haynes & Cahn 
(2011) claim that IHL historically failed to recognise and regulate SV against women in 
conflict due to the dominance of masculine ideals. In particular, they explain that 
because conflict was an activity carried out by men, the ‘laws of war’ were created from 
the “vista of a soldier’s need for ordered rules within which to wage war on behalf of 
the state” (Ni Aolain et al., 2011: 428). Consequently, women’s interests were rarely 
acknowledged on the basis that conflict was viewed as a ‘man’s world’. 
 
Seifert (1994) suggests that the silence around SV committed against women in conflict 
can be attributed to hegemonic power. She contends that “those who hold power have 
the power to name things” (Seifert, 1994: 67). In other words, because men have held a 
superior status position in society, they have ultimately been able to define and name 
experiences and harms in the context of conflict. Therefore, when men have interpreted 
and defined the experiences of women, they have done so in a manner that has kept 
their power intact (Seifert, 1994). Consequently, even when SV began to garner 
increased recognition within IHL, laws pertaining to SV were constructed on masculine 
values and ideals. For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and their 1977 
Additional Protocols I and II) very clearly prohibited rape and sexual assault, and called 
for the special protection of women in conflict. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention specifically stated that “women shall be especially protected against any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault" (ICRC, 2005: 6). However, SV constituted an attack against a 
woman’s ‘honour’, as opposed to being classified as a manifestation of violence 
(Copelon, 1994). Gardam & Charlesworth (2000: 159) argue that this term ‘honour’ 
was “constituted exclusively on the basis of certain sexual attributes, the characterising 
28 
 
features of which are important to men, namely the chastity and modesty of women”. In 
this respect, socio-cultural patterns of value characterised SV in a way that 
fundamentally supported masculine interpretations of sex. Entrenching such gendered 
views on violence has worked to undermine the seriousness of SV committed against 
women in conflict, and as a result, women have been greatly disadvantaged when 
claiming the right to justice under international legal doctrines. Therefore, for justice to 
be delivered fairly, social institutions must recognise how socio-cultural values related 
to status or identity limit the recognition of subordinated individuals within society 
(Franke, 2006). 
 
Establishing criminal accountability for human rights violations is important, as 
publicly acknowledging and condemning rights violations can be the first step towards 
providing redress for victims (Nowrojee, 2006). For some women, having their 
experiences acknowledged and validated in a formal justice procedure is an important 
component required to achieve justice under a recognition-based model. Henry (2009), 
for example, argues that some victims greatly benefit from speaking out about their 
experiences, as it can be therapeutic and can alleviate the psychological burden of 
silence. On this basis, it is important that justice mechanisms consider strategies of 
recognition that expose rights violations, as well as acknowledging the harm that 
violence causes to its victims. As discussed above, many women face wide-ranging 
challenges in the aftermath of SV. In addition to recognising SV victims in the justice 
process, it is also important that justice institutions proactively respond to the needs of 
these victims, allowing the next dimension of justice to be introduced. 
 
Redistribution 
Fraser’s (2007a) second dimension of justice is founded on the importance of 
redistribution. She argues that some individuals may have limited access to justice, due 
to economic structures that deny them the resources they need to participate equally 
with others. When this occurs, individuals suffer from what Fraser (2007a: 20) calls 
‘distributive injustice’ or ‘maldistribution’. She contends that the distribution of 
material resources needs to be fair, which is difficult given that social arrangements 
often institutionalise “deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth and 
income…thereby denying some people the means and opportunities to interact with 
others as peers”. However, a distributive model of justice that focuses solely on 
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economic injustice will not suffice, as it fails to recognise the full social and 
institutional context that determines distributive patterns (Young, 1990). Stanley (2009), 
for example, argues that structural injustice is underpinned by economy, as well as race, 
gender and other status disparities; all of which limit access to the resources and 
materials required when making justice claims. Therefore, this section will adopt 
Stanley’s (2009) approach, which details the connections between structural 
disadvantages (underpinned by socio-cultural values of gender, race and age and so on) 
and economic injustice, which affects how victims access the necessary resources when 
making justice claims. 
 
Justice institutions often fail to recognise that SV perpetrated against women in conflict 
can be inextricably linked to socially constructed power imbalances and culturally 
defined relationships (Freeman, 1999). This is problematic given that patterns of 
gendered inequality also locate individuals in positions of structural disadvantage, 
whereby women are unable to advance justice claims. For example, UN Women (2012) 
note that women are far more likely than men to be poor, which inhibits their access to 
food, education, healthcare, employment and control over assets. In this context, 
gendered socio-cultural values are closely entwined with economic structural forces that 
determine who has access to social resources and who does not. These social 
inequalities are only deepened in the aftermath of violence, when SV victims continue 
to face significant economic, educational, medical and socio-cultural barriers to justice 
(Bastick, Grimm & Kunz, 2007). 
 
For example, as previously shown, SV victims often require psychological and medical 
assistance in order to deal with their harms. Following sexual assault, many women may 
also be unable to work due to these often debilitating factors. However, existing patterns 
of social inequality prevent women from attaining access to required resources, such as 
adequate healthcare. As Brouwer (2005) notes, many SV victims are forced to deal with 
their trauma, physical injuries and contracted diseases on their own. Consequently, 
when healthcare, counselling and other such social resources in the aftermath of SV are 
unavailable, women suffer greatly. Therefore, in order for structural redress to occur, 
the existing inequalities that affect the path to justice need to be identified. The failure 
to recognise the needs of certain individuals, such as SV victims, can result in 
distributive injustice (Fraser, 2007a). 
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However, few institutions are equipped to deal with distribution in the form of 
reparation. In particular, Franke (2006) observes that successful international 
prosecutions are unlikely to order the transfer of money, power or other resources 
necessary to overcome violence and suffering. Therefore, even when SV crimes are 
marked by recognition, which may involve indicting and successfully prosecuting 
violators, justice is hampered by the failure to address the distributive needs of SV 
victims. Yet, for ‘participatory parity’ to be possible, Fraser (2007b) argues that victims 
must overcome status ‘misrecognition’, as well as ‘maldistribution’. 
 
Representation 
As discussed above, socio-cultural ‘misrecognition’ (which concerns how individuals 
are recognised and acknowledged), as well as ‘maldistribution’ (in relation to structural 
disadvantage, which subsequently determines how resources are allocated), can inhibit 
‘participatory parity’ in institutions designed to deliver justice. When specifically 
referring to gender, Reilly (2007: 169) asserts that gender bias often results in 
“structural, social and economic inequalities...which disproportionately disadvantage 
women in conflict” and impedes their full and equal political participation in justice 
mechanisms. Thus, Fraser’s (2007a) final notion of justice is concerned with how 
individuals are represented in political institutions established to deliver justice and 
adjudicate claims. 
 
Fraser (2007a: 21) notes that under this representational model of justice, political 
boundaries are established that determine “who is included” and “who is excluded” 
from those entitled to recognition and structural redress. However, even when 
individuals are recognised and included in justice proceedings, the established 
procedures determine the ways in which participants can air their claims (Fraser, 
2007a). Consequently, when justice is framed in such a way that excludes individuals 
from participating on a par with others, either in relation to political boundaries or 
political procedural rules, those individuals suffer from ‘misrepresentation’. In this vein, 
Fraser (2007a: 21) theorised that two kinds of ‘misrepresentation’ can occur in the 
frame of justice: ‘misframing’ occurs when individuals are excluded from participating 
in the justice process altogether, whereas ‘misrepresentation’ occurs when individuals 
are included in the justice process, but are denied the opportunity to participate on equal 
terms due to procedural rules and methods. 
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Although ‘misrepresentation’ can occur in isolation from other injustices based on 
‘misrecognition’ or ‘maldistribution’, the three are generally intertwined (Fraser, 2007a: 
21). As established thus far, injustice related to the socio-cultural model of 
‘misrecognition’ and structural (economic, gendered, raced, aged and so on) 
disadvantage often determines who is capable of advancing justice claims. In other 
words, individuals who belong to less powerful groups in society are more likely to be 
‘misrecognised’ in justice forums. Patriarchal values, for example, have impeded 
women from participating in political democratic institutions. The distinction made 
between the public and private sphere can be used as one example. Due to dominant 
socio-cultural values, men have dominated the public sphere, thus allowing them to 
regularly convene in political arenas; whereas women have been confined to the private 
sphere, where their primary responsibility has been limited to domesticated roles, such 
as raising children and keeping house (Charlton et al., 1989). 
 
Furthermore, some individuals (due to their status position) are also more likely to face 
structural disadvantage, which limits their access to necessary resources when pursuing 
claims to justice. For instance, given the dominant division of labour, women have often 
struggled to acquire funds to pay for legal representation (Porter, 2007). These pre-
existing social and economic deprivations discriminate and exclude women from 
accessing justice from the outset (Ni Aolain et al., 2011). Consequently, both 
‘misrecognition’ and ‘maldistribution’ can limit participatory parity in terms of 
‘representation’. 
 
With regard to ‘misframing’, Reilly (2007) argues that women have been excluded from 
meaningfully participating in justice institutions dedicated to enforcing human rights. 
Consequently, when such institutions have implemented and enforced human rights 
norms, they have often failed to respect, or have been ignored altogether, the interests of 
women (Reilly, 2007). As discussed above, the lack of recognition that SV has received 
within IHL has greatly limited the opportunity for SV victims to bring their claims 
forward. To counteract this issue, it is important that justice institutions recognise the 
social, economic and political realities of their subjects (Carpenter, 2008). 
 
However, even when women have been included in the claims making processes, 
‘misrepresentation’ has occurred, where political decisions and rules either denied 
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women the opportunity to air their claims or worked to invalidate them (Fraser, 2007a). 
Porter (2007), for example, argues that institutional notions of justice often rely too 
heavily on rules and procedural processes. She claims that this can work to discount 
“the social relationships of those affected by injustice...consequently failing to recognise 
the impact of pain, loss of self-dignity and suffering” of victims participating in justice 
proceedings (Porter, 2007: 107). Where SV victims are concerned, this becomes 
especially problematic, as procedural notions of justice can exacerbate pain and 
suffering. As will be discussed in the following chapter, even when international legal 
proceedings result in successful convictions, women can be subject to secondary forms 
of victimisation, as a result of gender insensitive court practices (Franke, 2006). This 
becomes problematic; as such occurrences can undermine positive practices of 
recognition. Therefore, if women are to be fairly represented in the justice making 
process, institutions need to be aware of the socio-cultural norms and structural forces 
which inhibit participation in justice institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
Upon critically exploring the phenomenon of SV in conflict, in regards to its causes, 
functions and consequences, this chapter established SV as a problem that requires 
recognition in the international legal framework. This chapter outlines that SV in 
conflict takes many forms and fulfils a range of functions, thus making it a useful and 
effective ‘weapon of warfare’. This chapter notes that females make up the majority of 
SV victims, and are commonly targeted as a means to immobilise and humiliate whole 
communities. Furthermore, this chapter highlights that SV can have long-term physical, 
psychological and other socially debilitating consequences for its victims. Many victims 
are forced to deal with the aftermath of SV on their own, due to the shame and stigma 
attached to such violence. When SV victims reveal their experiences they can be 
devalued, ostracised and sometimes even blamed for such violence. For that reason, it is 
important that institutional responses to SV work to undo these harms, by recognising 
and responding to the needs and expectations of its victims. With this in mind, this 
chapter introduced Fraser’s tripartite model of justice. Fraser (2007a: 21) argues that a 
holistic approach to justice must address issues of representation, along with 
distribution and recognition. 
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Chapter Three: Securing Justice for Sexual Violence Victims 
in International Criminal Tribunals 
In addition to exploring the causes, functions and consequences of SV in conflict, the 
previous chapter introduced Fraser’s (2007a) theoretical model based on three important 
dimensions of justice: (i) recognition, the way socio-cultural patterns impact upon how 
individuals are recognised in the justice process; (ii) redistribution, the way structural 
injustices, determined by status disparities, can affect how individuals gain access to 
resources which enable them to participate on a par with others; and (iii) representation, 
the way membership and procedural issues determine how individuals can pursue 
justice claims. This chapter builds on these themes, focusing on how justice can be 
secured for SV victims in international court processes. 
 
The first ICTs of real significance emerged in the wake of WWII. The Tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo established international legal efforts to prosecute and punish 
those responsible for war-time atrocities. Despite criticism
15
, the significance of these 
ICTs has been highly acclaimed, as they developed important legal precedents laying 
down the groundwork for increased recognition and enforcement of IHL
16
 (Futamura, 
2008; Weiss & Daws, 2007). However, due to the Cold War, and also related to the 
international community’s lack of commitment to accountability for international 
crimes, the enforcement of IHL was deeply limited from the 1950s to the 1990s 
(Futamura, 2008). Nonetheless, the 1990s saw a resurgence of ICT activity when the 
UN established the International ad hoc Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) (Weiss & Daws, 2007). Since then, the UN has established a range of 
other tribunals (and hybrid courts) in many post-conflict countries, including Timor-
Leste, Cambodia and Sierra Leone. In the last decade, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has also been established. 
 
                                               
15 Perhaps the most significant criticism being that the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials functioned to deliver 
‘victor’s justice’. These ICTs failed to indict and prosecute ‘victors’ who were also responsible for 
committing crimes during the war and instead focused on crimes committed by the Axis powers 
(Futamura, 2008; Peskin, 2008: 214; Zolo, 2009).  
16 Shortly after WWII, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and their Additional protocols) were brought into 
force (ICRC, 2010). The UN also created other international legal documents in an effort to develop IHL, 
which included the 1948 Genocide Convention (Schabas, 2006). In 1950, the UN International Law 
Commission recognised the principles adopted by the Nuremburg ICT and rendered them as important 
components of IHL (UN, 2005). 
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The establishment of an ICT creates the opportunity for a variety of positive 
opportunities whereby: a detailed record of events can be documented; crimes can be 
named and defined; key perpetrators can be held legally accountable for their actions; 
calls for revenge can be dissipated; re-establishing respect for the ‘rule of law’ can help 
to deter further violations; international relations can be developed by reinforcing the 
norms of accountability for violations of IHL; and, fragile democratic institutions can be 
strengthened (Futamura, 2008; Huyse, 1995; Nowrojee, 2005; Vinjamuri & Synder, 
2004). 
 
However, an increasing body of knowledge has begun to address the gender dynamics 
of these justice frameworks. Feminists have begun to question whether international 
justice bodies are capable of adequately addressing and responding to the concerns of 
women in societies affected by conflict. For justice to be meaningful, it is important that 
these mechanisms take into consideration the needs, expectations and experiences of 
victims affected by systematic violence (Lambourne, 2009; Porter, 2007). Therefore, the 
following sections correlate the findings of feminist research with Fraser’s (2007a) 
tripartite model of justice, to establish how ICTs have functioned to deliver justice to 
SV victims. In doing so, this chapter will help to ‘set the scene’ for how SV crimes, as 
well as its victims, have been acknowledged in the ICTR crimes process. 
 
Promoting Recognition  
As discussed in Chapter Two, recognition-based justice can play an important role in 
the acknowledgement and redress of harm for SV victims. While some victims may 
want to forget their experiences in an attempt to move on with their lives, publicly 
acknowledging and condemning SV can help restore the dignity and integrity of those 
who have been victimised. International court mechanisms that condemn SV can be one 
means by which women may attain formal recognition for harms committed against 
them (Lambourne, 2009). More specifically, upon defining, prosecuting and punishing 
SV, ICTs create an opportunity for victims’ identities to be formally re-valued through 
processes of recognition (Fraser, 2007a). 
 
Recognition for SV victims was firmly established with the introduction of the ICTY. 
This tribunal was the first ICT to “deal exclusively with sexual crimes… rather than 
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grouping such offences with killings and similar war crimes as the ‘accompanying 
phenomena’ of war” (IWPR, 2005: 1). As previously mentioned, rape was explicitly 
defined as a ‘crime against humanity’ for the first time in IHL, under Article 5(g) of the 
ICTY Statute (ICTY, 2009a: 6). Following the classification of such crimes, the ICTY 
became the first ICT to successfully enter convictions for SV as torture, sexual 
enslavement and as a crime against humanity (ICTY, 2012). Since these developments, 
other ICTs (and international/hybrid courts) have developed specific legal provisions 
condemning SV, and as a result, have successfully prosecuted such crimes. 
 
In the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), Article 2(g) of the SCSL Statute 
explicitly defined sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other 
form of SV as crimes against humanity (SCSL, 2000). Due to such explicit legal 
classifications, the SCSL became the first internationalised court to successfully convict 
sexual slavery and forced marriage as crimes against humanity (Office of the 
Prosecutor, 2009). Special SV provisions have also been included in the Statute of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in East Timor (see Sellers, 2007). The Rome Statute of the newly established 
ICC also explicitly condemns SV
17
, and considered charges of rape for the first time in 
the trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba (Smith, 2010). 
 
Inhibiting Recognition 
In addition to promoting recognition-based justice, ICTs also limit and/or undermine 
positive practices of recognition. ICTs can only hope to deal with a limited number of 
cases (concerning all violations) due to institutional capabilities. Consequently, 
perpetrators brought before ICTs are a small proportion of those who have committed 
serious violations (UN, 2010): meaning that many perpetrators will not be held 
accountable or punished for their actions. While some SV victims might attain 
recognition-based justice within formal international legal proceedings, most will not 
have any personal experience of recognition due to such incapacities. In this respect, 
                                               
17 The Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 7(g) lists rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of SV of comparable gravity as crimes against 
humanity; Article 8(b) (xxii) also lists these violations as serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflict; while Article 8(e) (vi) lists these violations as serious violations of the 
Geneva Conventions (ICC, 2011).  
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individualised needs and concerns become lost in the broader aims of ICT proceedings. 
For example, Franke (2006: 819) argues that: 
In the context of mass atrocities…tribunals cannot come close to delivering 
‘perfect justice’ by establishing culpability and accountability for all of the 
actors who caused egregious harm in the past. Instead, the tribunals have to 
settle for a minority of cases that can be used to establish important 
precedent, identify important kingpins or masterminds of 
violence…Witnesses in these cases are invaluable resources in the 
production of wholesale justice, but the individuals become less important 
than the larger principles which their testimony helps establish. 
 
In other words, international criminal law functions to fulfil broader aims, such as 
creating international legal precedent. Consequently, the law can only go so far in 
providing individualised justice for SV claimants, as well as other victims. 
 
However, even taking into account the fact that ICTs can only deal with a limited 
number of cases, they have still fallen short of adequately responding to SV within the 
means of their institutional mandates. For example, many scholars have commented on 
what they call a ‘hierarchy of crimes’, where crimes of genocide, murder, extermination 
and torture have taken precedence over crimes of SV (see Galina, 2010; Levy, 1994; Ni 
Aolain et al., 2011; Nowrojee, 2005). Part of this can be attributed to time constraints 
and limited court resources, which results in prosecutors focusing on ‘more serious’ 
crimes (Seelinger, Silverberg & Mejia, 2011). Galina (2012: 16), for example, argues 
that issues related to time constraints, financial limitations, inexperienced investigators, 
difficulties in gathering evidence and administrative and technical problems, means that 
who to indict and on what charge becomes a strategic and politically motivated decision 
within ICTs. 
 
However, even when SV cases do progress, victims often fail to get recognised. 
Acknowledging SV in the framework of IHL has been pivotal to the success of 
recognising its victims in ICT proceedings and bringing their perpetrators to account
18
 
                                               
18 The Nuremburg and Tokyo Charters both failed to generate distinct and separate qualifications for SV 
crimes. For example, rape was not mentioned as a crime against humanity (see International Research and 
Documentation Centre for War Crimes Trials (ICWC), 1945: 2; University of Oslo, 1946: 1). 
Consequently, the Nuremburg ICT failed to indict and prosecute SV despite evidence indicating that 
countless numbers of women were raped in Europe throughout WWII (Meir, 2004). The Tokyo ICT, 
however, managed to successfully prosecute SV as a war crime, under ‘inhumane treatment’, ‘ill 
treatment’ and ‘failure to respect family honour and rights’ (Brouwer, 2005). Yet, by failing to provide a 
distinct and separate qualification for SV, such acts became subsidiary human rights abuses that were 
lumped with other war crimes (Levy, 1994).  
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(Green, Copelon, Cotter & Stephens, 1994). However, Franke (2006: 817) criticises that 
these advances have been more “symbolic than revolutionary in nature”. Grewal 
(2010a: 1) elaborates on this assertion, claiming that the development of law which 
condemns SV has not changed the “phallocentric core” of international institutions. She 
argues that international legal justice mechanisms are still dominated by male-centric 
principles and constructs, which has meant that ICTs have presented some of the same 
crushing limitations that can be observed in national criminal justice settings
19
. Like 
domestic courts, ICTs fail to satisfactorily take into account issues pertaining to the 
reality and seriousness of SV and the respectful treatment of SV victims within court 
proceedings (Brouwer, 2005: 453). As a result, ICTs have limited opportunities for 
women to attain recognition-based justice. 
 
Part of the problem rests with the fact that, as a whole, ICTs are not victim based. 
Haldemann (2008), for example, argues that legal proceedings are primarily used to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial. International legal 
proceedings are based on the common law system, where the court operates in an 
adversarial manner. The adversarial court system is based on the premise of discovering 
the ‘truth’, whereby the Prosecution and Defence present their case before a judge or 
jury (Haldemann, 2008). Within this system, a victim is called forward only to answer 
questions (Trumbell, 2008). In other words, the victim’s role is limited to that of a 
witness, where they are part of a larger process where the Prosecution and Defence set 
out to ‘prove’ a given case (Nowrojee, 2005). Therefore, although providing testimony 
can alleviate the psychological burden of silence, the kind of ‘truth telling’ that ICTs 
allow does not always correspond with what justice entails for victims
20
. Henry (2009) 
notes that, in many cases, victims only get to tell a small piece of their story, which is 
often frequently interrupted for the purpose of questioning. Furthermore, the 
Prosecution and Defence often focus on confirming factual evidence as opposed to 
                                               
19 Feminist scholarship notes that insensitive and demeaning court procedures, such as excessive 
questioning, methods of cross examination and defamatory rules concerning SV, have worked to devalue 
women and undermine the seriousness of SV. Domestic courts have also allowed for rape myths to 
permeate judicial proceedings. Consequently, SV victims have commonly encountered attitudes of 
insensitivity and disbelief by court and other criminal justice staff officials. These factors, among many 
others, have meant that many SV victims have suffered secondary-victimisation, which can sometimes 
equate with the level of harm caused by SV in the first instance. See for example, Jordan (2001, 2011) 
and McDonald & Tinsley (2011). 
20 Franke (2006) argues that justice for victims involves being given the opportunity to freely share their 
experiences, followed by the recognition that they are being heard. 
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letting the victim ‘tell all’. Consequently, their testimony can become fragmented and 
their experiences risk being invalidated. In this regard, some scholars have argued that 
story telling in legal forums can only take the form of giving legal evidence, and does 
not operate as a therapeutic outlet for many victims (see Dembour & Haslam, 2004; 
Franke, 2006; Lambourne, 2009). 
 
Conveying traumatic experiences can also lead to the marginalisation of storytellers. 
Within court processes, human suffering is often translated into the language of the law, 
so that victims’ testimonies are “legally digestible” (Stanley, 2009: 61). This can be 
particularly dehumanising, as victims are required to answer specific questions which 
are irrelevant to their present troubles, but necessary, in terms of fulfilling the 
requirements of the law (Dembour & Haslam, 2004). For example, in cases where ‘non-
consent’ must be proven in order to fulfil the legal definition of rape, questions can be 
offensive and humiliating for the victim, and can make them feel as though they are not 
believed (Brouwer, 2005). For instance, in Kunarac et al., the ICTY Chamber held that 
the absence of non-consent should be raised, despite the Prosecution having established 
that rape had been committed under coercive circumstances. In her concluding 
statement, the Prosecutor noted that the witness was appropriately outraged by the 
questions she was required to answer in order to fulfil the element of non-consent
21
 
[Kunarac et al. Judgement]. 
 
International legal frameworks also regularly draw attention to sexist views that present 
themselves in everyday society. Problematically, sex-stereotyped views are often 
legitimised and further enhanced in international legal frameworks (Carpenter, 2008). 
For example, Sharratt’s (2011) research discovered that the perceptions of staff 
members of the ICTY and the War Crimes Court in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) were 
tainted by high levels of misogyny, biases and rape myth acceptance. Within her study, 
she conducted a total of 58 in depth interviews with members from these two courts, 
and encountered views such as: 
                                               
21 This woman had been held in detention in Foca for 40 days, and was subjected to rape over 150 times 
during her detention. During trial she was asked many questions, including: “Please, Madam, if over a 
period of 40 days you have sex with someone, with several individuals, do you really think that is with 
your own will?” [Kunarac et al Judgement: 2235-2236]. 
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You know what...when I’m assigned to a case involving rape... (Silence) I often 
have doubts as to whether it actually happened or not - Male Judge, BiH (Sharratt, 
2011: 8) 
 
I do not understand the cruelty of the rapes, the mutilations, the markings, the 
killings. I can see if a group of men were fighting in the bush for weeks, when 
they come [out], they rape. That I understand - Senior ICTY Judge (Sharratt, 
2011: 65) 
 
Informed by such findings, Sharratt (2011) argues that some ICTY and BiH staff have 
demonstrated little regard for the seriousness of SV, or the context in which such crimes 
have taken place. As a result, SV victims have been at increased risk of secondary 
victimisation within court proceedings (also see Askin, 2005; Coomaraswamy, 2005; 
Franke, 2006; Henry, 2009; Ni Aolain et al., 2011). 
 
Last of all, Franke (2006: 822) argues that at their most sensitive to SV, ICTs recognise 
women as victims. She contends that within particular legal contexts, the term victim is 
often deemed necessary in terms of conforming to relevant laws when seeking legal 
redress. However, upon accepting this term, it is expected that women present their 
sexual vulnerability in order to be taken seriously. This is greatly detrimental to the 
character of many women who, despite having being victimised, demonstrate great 
strength and resourcefulness. Askin (2003: 525) argues that labelling these dynamic 
survivors as victims fails to accurately portray them and “fully respect, embolden and 
empower” women as “survivors and enablers”. In other words, ICTs stereotype victims 
upon failing to recognise the complexity of their experiences and their reactions to SV. 
Therefore, whilst ICTs have created some opportunities for SV victims to attain 
recognition-based justice, these opportunities are markedly limited, and are commonly 
undermined through these practices. 
 
Providing Redistribution 
Beyond recognising the identities of SV victims, it is also important that international 
criminal justice mechanisms recognise and respond to the problems associated with 
structural redress. As discussed in Chapter Two, structural disadvantages (including 
economic, raced and gendered disadvantages) can render some individuals more 
vulnerable to violence than others. Furthermore, structural disadvantages also inhibit 
how individuals can access justice in the aftermath of violence. 
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Given that women are located in a position of structural disadvantage, as a result of their 
devalued position in society, justice initiatives that respond to women’s immediate 
needs can prove highly advantageous. Many SV victims might benefit from forms of 
reparation or compensation, which would enable them to have adequate access to 
healthcare, rehabilitation and support services (Brouwer, 2005). Furthermore, 
distribution might also be used to address the connected harms related to SV, such as 
food, education, rent and adequate housing requirements (Brouwer, 2005). This is 
important given that some women may not be able to fulfil their livelihood as a result of 
being sexually victimised. Therefore, forms of distribution that address these issues can 
assist victims in their attempt to put their lives back together. Compensation, in 
particular, might help with necessary material, medical, psychological, social assistance, 
and support often required after SV (Brouwer, 2005). 
 
ICTs can provide opportunities for SV victims to attain some redistributive-based 
justice. The ‘Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse 
of Power’ (General Assembly (GA), 1985) was created to assist governments, and the 
‘international community’, in their efforts to secure justice and provide assistance to 
victims of IHL. In particular, this Declaration details that governments are obligated to 
address issues concerned with restitution, compensation and assistance when victims 
have been subjected to violations of IHL. It proclaims that: 
States should consider incorporating into national law norms proscribing 
abuse of power and providing remedies to victims of such abuses. In 
particular, such remedies should include restitution and/or compensation, 
and necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance and 
support. (GA, 1985: 5) 
 
In line with these standards, ICTs have created rules of procedure, which seek to make 
redistributive justice attainable. For example, the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (Rule 106 and 107, see ICTY, 2009b: 104-105) contains provisions for the 
restitution of property or proceeds to their rightful owner, and victim compensation. 
However, ICTs have also responded more directly to SV victim’s needs. The ICTY, for 
example, provides medical and psychological support to victims in the ICTY process 
through the work of the Victim and Witness Support Section (VWSS) (see Chifflet, 
2003). 
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For some scholars, redistribution is also connected to undoing harm. In this respect, 
ICTs have also played a redistributive function, which has allowed for the successful 
distribution of power. When an individual is harmed by another they are overcome by 
powerlessness. However, upon formally recognising the ‘wrongdoer’ and holding them 
to account, a sense of power and control can be restored to the victim (Haldemann, 
2008). Thus by prosecuting and punishing those guilty of violations of IHL, ICTs create 
the opportunity for shame to be redistributed from victim to perpetrator (Franke, 2006). 
From these observations, ICTs can be seen to deliver redistribution in some ways. 
However, as detailed in the following section, distributive-based justice remains fairly 
limited. 
 
Inhibiting Redistribution 
While ICTs cannot be expected to fulfil all elements of redistribution, they should at the 
very least be “imbued with the spirit of redistributive justice” (Stanley, 2009: 69). 
However, this has not been the case, as ICTs have largely failed to address distributive 
needs of victims. Within her work, Stanley (2009) raises the importance of victim 
capabilities. She proposes that participation within legal institutions cannot be readily 
secured by those that do not have the full capability to advance their claims. There are 
various factors which can affect a victim’s capacity to participate in international legal 
proceedings, such as age, disability, previous experiences, the nature of the crime 
perpetrated against them, personality and coping skills (International Criminal Law 
Serious (ICLS), n.d: 13). However, capabilities are also limited due to structural 
disadvantages (economic, ‘raced’ and gendered) which operate on a much deeper 
societal level. Many victims cannot access justice from the outset due to their position 
of structural disadvantage (Ni Aolain et al., 2011). 
 
Where gendered structural disadvantage is concerned, women are more likely to have 
limited mobility and a lack of socio-economic resources in the aftermath of conflict 
(Porter, 2007). Furthermore, they are more likely to have deficits in education, and poor 
legal literacy, making them less capable of pursuing justice claims (Henry, 2009). These 
social disadvantages are closely related to the social ordering of society, whereby socio-
cultural and socio-economic values have determined the way in which society is 
organised (Fraser, 2007a). Problematically, criminal procedures often exclude the 
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female subject upon failing to recognise existing inequalities and societal values that 
prohibit her participation (Carpenter, 2008). These structural disadvantages are 
exacerbated in the wake of SV, as affected women can be faced with debilitating 
physical, psychological, social and economic consequences. 
 
Despite this, international legal systems often focus on addressing civil and political 
rights, and regularly fail to address economic and social rights in conflict (Arbour, 
2007; Ni Aolain et al., 2011; Stanley, 2009). Ni Aolain et al. (2011), for example, 
contend that international justice mechanisms often fail to capture the full picture of 
rights violations experienced and suffered by women. Where accountability 
mechanisms have recognised SV, they often fail to recognise and address the connected 
harms, such as psychological and physical injury, and other social and economic harms 
(Ni Aolain et al., 2011). Arbour (2007) also comments on the secondary ranking of 
social, economic and cultural rights. She argues that there is often resistance to 
affirming these rights, as protecting them can be burdensome and expensive. This is 
problematic, given that the protection of these rights can contribute to “the redress and 
prevention of widespread discrimination”, and hence greater justice (Arbour, 2007: 22). 
After all, victims see these struggles as interconnected (Stanley, 2009). 
 
Although ICTs possess the capacity to engage in compensation (and other forms of 
redress) for those identified as victims, the evidence thus far indicates that they have 
limited distributive opportunities. Oosterveld (2005), for example, states that provisions 
pertaining to Rule 106 and 107 in the ICTY have not been invoked. Furthermore, while 
compensation issues have been raised within ICTY proceedings, where ICTY judges 
have requested that the UN create a mechanism that works alongside, but outside the 
Tribunal to address such concerns, the UN has failed to act on such requests (Zacklin, 
2004). Other ICTs have also failed to adequately address compensation issues (see 
Bassiouni, 2008; Brouwer, 2005: 383-420). Moreover, the needs of SV victims have 
been addressed by ICTs in VWSS’s, yet such support has been limited to their stay at 
the Tribunal (Chifflet, 2003). In addition, those victims not included in court processes 
cannot benefit from such services. 
 
For Fraser (2007b), justice must combine an approach that addresses the importance of 
recognition, as well as redistribution. Failing to address the distributive needs of victims 
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can undermine the positive outcome of recognition, especially because there is a close 
connection between formal recognition and compensation in the form of distribution. 
As Haldemann (2008: 729) asserts: 
Without some form of monetary compensation, an apology for serious 
wrongdoing risks being superficial, half-hearted, or meaningless...many 
individuals will be inclined not to take such apologies seriously. There is, 
here, the sense that ‘talk is cheap’. 
 
Thus, without some form of distribution, positive practices of recognition-based justice 
risk being undermined. 
 
Promoting and Inhibiting Representation 
International legal justice bodies have inhibited women’s representation in many ways. 
Despite recent attempts to encourage female participation within peace and post-conflict 
initiatives
22
, international legal institutions still fail to adequately recognise the 
“significant gender inequalities and biases that limit women’s meaningful participation 
at every stage in post-conflict transition” (Reilly, 2007: 155). Feminist scholarship 
frequently draws attention to the gendered power imbalance that exists in international 
institutions, and argues that because women have been excluded from peace-making 
processes, women’s issues remain marginalised or unaccounted for within justice 
institutions (see Charlesworth et al., 1991; Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2006; Gardam, 
2005; Reilly, 2007). 
In this vein, Carpenter (2008) argues that institutions designed to deliver justice have 
only been accessible to individuals who hold economic, social and political power. As a 
result, women have been excluded from making justice claims, because they are 
commonly located in positions of structural disadvantage: as discussed above. However, 
even when women have been included in the claims making processes, 
‘misrepresentation’ has occurred, where political decisions and rules have denied 
women the opportunity to air their claims, or have worked to invalidate them (Fraser, 
2007a). Porter (2007), for example, argues that institutional notions of justice often rely 
too heavily on rules and procedural processes that adhere to the law. She claims that this 
                                               
22 In 2009 a UN SC Resolution affirmed: “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution 
of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full 
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to 
increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution” (SC, 2000a: 7). 
For a full overview, see Porter (2007: 11-42). 
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can work to discount the social relationships of those affected by injustice, consequently 
failing to recognise the impact of pain and loss of self-dignity of victims who participate 
in justice proceedings. As discussed above, criminal procedures tend to benefit criminal 
defendants, and the court operates to conform to legal narratives. This has meant that 
the individualised needs of victims go unrecognised. In addition, victim participation is 
fairly limited on the basis that they cannot air their claims in the way they desire, or in a 
manner that is consistent with their understanding of justice. 
 
Closely related to this point, is the notion that ICT proceedings have been dominated by 
male standards. Ni Aolain (1997: 885) argues that the rules of evidence concerning SV 
have helped perpetuate “unstated social understandings regarding female and male 
sexuality”. As discussed above, sex-stereotyped and sex-discriminatory practices are 
common-place in ICT proceedings. These practices can inhibit participation, especially 
when rules of evidence allow for such views to be perpetuated in criminal procedures. 
Feminists have long questioned procedural techniques that allow the Defence to 
question SV victims in a hostile manner, or introduce ‘evidence’ influenced by sex-
biased attitudes (Reilly, 2007). The most pertinent procedural rule is one which allows a 
woman’s prior sexual history to be examined, supposedly proving her consent to sex by 
attacking her credibility (Carpenter, 2008). This contention harks back to male-focused 
interpretations of SV. If a woman is to be considered a true victim, she must prove that 
she is modest and chaste (Charlesworth & Gardam, 2000, Green et al., 1994). Although 
the latter issue has been addressed by the ICTs
23
, serious concerns remain around the 
conduct of Defence teams, as will be identified in the following chapter. The existence 
of these procedures is problematic, because if women do not feel safe and are subjected 
to further trauma, the benefits of participating in justice proceedings offer little to help 
them in their recovery. 
 
ICTs have made some efforts to provide support and protection to victims, which is 
important in terms of promoting their participation within justice procedures. For 
example, the ICTY established a VWSS which allowed for a range of protective 
                                               
23 Within the ICTY, Rule 96 (VI) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that, “prior sexual 
conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence” (ICTY, 2009b: 99). 
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measures to be undertaken
24
. However, although well intentioned, these units have been 
fairly limited. The processes set in place have not always secured the safety of victims 
and witnesses. Sharratt (2011), for example, notes that names of victims were often 
leaked to the press and commonly spoken aloud during ICTY trial proceedings by 
judges or prosecutors (meaning that the Accused knew the names of victims who had 
testified in closed circuit). Cases were even reported where lawyers and judges had 
leaked the names of protected victims to their relatives, which sometimes meant that 
names were disseminated to the public. This became problematic due to the heavy 
shame and stigma surrounding SV. When victim’s names were leaked, they became 
vulnerable to harassment and were often stigmatised on their return home. 
 
Stover’s (2005) research on the ICTY reveals much the same. He argues that, of the 
protected witnesses he had interviewed, the majority felt that protection measures had 
failed and had left them open to recrimination. Other witnesses revealed that protective 
measures made no difference, as it was well known within their community that they 
had testified at the Tribunal. Green et al., (1994: 219) note that support for VWSS’s has 
been fairly limited, in terms of staffing, funding and other necessities which are required 
to allow such programmes to operate effectively. 
 
Conclusion 
Although ICTs have facilitated some justice for SV victims, the opportunities to attain 
to recognition, redistributive and representative notions of justice have been limited. 
This chapter highlights that ICTs have facilitated recognition-based justice for SV 
victims, namely through the development of IHL. However, serious problems remain 
concerning the ways in which crimes of SV are addressed, and how women are treated 
within ICT proceedings. Furthermore, although ICTs do offer the opportunity to 
                                               
24  Rule 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY, 2009b: 75) states that the ICTY can 
undertake:  
(i) Measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or whereabouts 
of a victim or a witness, or of persons related  to or associated with a victim or witness by 
such means as:  
A. Expunging names and identifying information from the  Tribunal’s public records  
B. Non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the  victim or witness  
C. Giving of testimony through image- or voice- altering devices or closed circuit 
television 
D. Assignment of a pseudonym 
(ii) Closed sessions, in accordance with Rule 79 
(iii) Appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, 
such as one-way closed circuit television 
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administer redistributive justice, clauses related to reparation, compensation and 
restitution have not been enacted. In addition, while power can be redistributed from 
perpetrator to victim after obtaining a successful conviction, such practices are limited 
given that ICTs fail to respond to other redistributive injustices (Fraser, 2007a). Lastly, 
this chapter notes that while ICTs have undertaken measures to encourage victim 
participation, particularly upon establishing VWSS’s, these efforts have been 
compromised due to significant operational issues. The next chapter practically applies 
and expands on these arguments, and considers how justice has been secured for SV 
victims within the ICTR crimes process. 
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Chapter Four: Responding to Sexual Violence in the United 
Nation’s International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The ICTR was established by the UN’s SC on the November 8th, 1994 (SC, 1994b). 
Under its mandate, the Tribunal was given the power to prosecute individuals 
responsible for serious violations of IHL committed in Rwanda, and in neighbouring 
states, between January 1
st
 and December 31
st
, 1994 (ICTR, 2010a: 59). The Tribunal 
hopes to restore peace in Rwanda, contribute to the process of national reconciliation, 
and deter further violations by re-establishing the ‘rule of law’ (SC, 1994b). 
 
However, this Tribunal initially focused on prosecuting those responsible for crimes of 
genocide, murder and torture, meaning that crimes of SV went unaddressed (see Galina, 
2010). Part of this neglect can be attributed to the fact that UN investigative reports 
forwarded to the Tribunal failed to mention SV and those culpable for such acts
25
. It 
was not until nine months after the genocide, when women started giving birth in 
unprecedented numbers
26
, that SV was brought to the attention of UN investigations 
(Charlesworth & Gardam, 2000). Consequently, unlike the ICTY
27
, the SC Resolution 
establishing the ICTR failed to mention systematic SV (see SC, 1994b). Nonetheless, 
the ICTR Statute governing the work of the Tribunal explicitly defined rape as a crime 
against humanity under Article 3(g), and listed rape, enforced prostitution and any form 
of indecent assault, as an outrage upon personal dignity under Article 4(e) (ICTR, 
2010a: 61). These Articles presented an opportunity for SV victims to seek justice for 
the harms committed against them. 
 
This chapter presents original documentary research data which was obtained through 
the critical examination of completed ICTR cases. Of the 43 cases identified, 25 contain 
references to SV committed against Rwandan women and girls. 23 of these cases were 
used for this research project (see Appendix I & II). These cases provide great insight 
                                               
25 For example, the UN Secretary-General, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights 
and the Rwandan Commission of Experts failed to mention SV in their first reports to the UN (see SC, 
1994c; Degni-Segui, 1994; SC, 1994d; SC, 1994e). 
26 The National Population Office of Rwanda estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 children were born 
from rape (Mukangendo, 2007: 40). 
27 The SC resolution establishing the ICTY expressed its grave concern that serious IHL violations had 
been committed throughout the Balkans, including the organised and systematic rape of women (see SC, 
1993: 1). 
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into how the ICTR has prioritised and responded to SV, as well as the needs of its 
victims. Research findings are integrated with broader literature to build a nuanced and 
informed analysis of the Tribunal’s failings and successes. 
 
Using Fraser’s (2007a) tripartite model of justice as a theoretical backdrop, this chapter 
critically evaluates the ICTR, in relation to how this Tribunal has responded to SV and 
its victims. In doing so, this chapter details some of the generic problems faced by the 
ICTR, which has affected all victims. This chapter is divided into three main sections: 
the first section highlights how the ICTR has secured recognition for SV victims by 
recognising the crimes committed against them and holding their perpetrators to 
account; the second section discusses how the ICTR has limited and undermined 
positive practices of recognition, due to significant problems with its institutional 
framework, institutional incapacities, and problems with participation; and, the last 
section demonstrates how the ICTR has both secured and limited redistribution for SV 
victims. 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated thus far, Fraser’s (2007a) three dimensions of justice 
share interlocking and similar features. In particular, both ‘misrecognition’ and 
‘maldistribution’ can limit participatory parity in terms of ‘representation’, because 
socio-cultural norms and structural forces inhibit participation in justice institutions. 
Due to these interconnections, this chapter discusses representative notions of justice 
under the recognition model of justice, relative to problems with participation. Within 
this section, structural disadvantages, which are directly related to Fraser’s redistributive 
model of justice, will also be discussed. I have intentionally included these observations 
here, because criminal procedures often exclude women by failing to recognise the 
existing structural and social inequalities that prohibit their participation (Carpenter, 
2008). 
 
Securing Recognition for Sexual Violence Victims in the ICTR  
The ICTR has been able to provide some level of recognition of SV and its victims (see 
Appendix I and II). Of the 23 cases that contain references to SV, 19 included SV 
charges, leading to six successful convictions overall (see Appendix II: Section (i)). 
Two additional cases included instances where acts of SV underpinned convictions for 
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other crimes (see Appendix II: Section (v): Rutaganda and Nahimana et al.). Within 
these eight cases of conviction, SV acts were successfully prosecuted as crimes against 
humanity (rape, inhumane acts, persecution and torture), war crimes (rape and other 
forms of indecent sexual assault) and genocide (see Appendix I). 
 
When charging any act as a crime against humanity, the attack must have been 
committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian 
population
28
. The ICTR found rape to be a crime against humanity in five cases 
[Akayesu, Bagosora et al., Gacumbitsi, Muhimana and Semanza]. In the genocidal 
context, most SV acts were committed against Tutsi women and girls. For example, in 
Bagosora et al., the Chamber found that rape was committed against Tutsi women and 
girls by the Rwandan Military who, at times, worked in conjunction with the 
Interahamwe at roadblocks, community centres and churches. These acts were 
successfully charged as rape as a crime against humanity. The Chamber recognised that 
“the assailants and the Accused were aware that these attacks formed part of a 
widespread and systematic attack on racial and political grounds” [Bagosora Judgement: 
556]. The ICTR also managed to successfully recognise the rape of Hutu women as rape 
as a crime against humanity. In Gacumbitsi, for example, a Hutu woman who was 
married to a Tutsi testified to having been raped. The Chamber acknowledged that 
“through the woman it was her husband, a Tutsi civilian, who was the target. Thus, the 
rape was part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tutsi civilians” 
[Gacumbitsi Judgement: 56]. 
 
SV was also recognised under other categories (listed as crimes against humanity) such 
as inhumane acts, persecution and torture. For example, forcing women to undress in 
public and making them march and perform exercises were recognised as inhumane acts 
                                               
28 As listed under Article 3 of the ICTR Statute (ICTR, 2010a: 61): 
The ICTR shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation; 
(e) Imprisonment; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape; 
(h) Persecution; 
(i) Other inhumane acts. 
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[Akayesu]; the act of stripping the body of a dead Tutsi woman and then inserting a 
stick into her vagina was successfully charged as an inhumane act [Niyitegeka]; the rape 
of a woman was successfully charged as an act of rape and as an act of torture, due to 
rape being used for a discriminatory purpose [Semanza]; and, the act of inserting a 
bottle into the Prime Minister’s vagina was successfully prosecuted as an inhumane act, 
as well as an act of persecution, although overturned on appeal due to questions of 
culpability [Bagosora et al.]. 
 
The most profound success of the ICTR, however, was that it became the first ICT to 
successfully prosecute SV as a crime of genocide
29
 in the trial of Akayesu (see 
Appendix II: Section (i): Case 1). In Akayesu, the Chamber ruled that SV can constitute 
genocide if such acts are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
targeted group. Therefore, the Chamber made findings relative to Article 2(b) of the 
ICTR Statute noting that: 
Rape and SV certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental 
harm on its victims...In light of all the evidence before it, the Chamber is 
satisfied that the acts of rape and SV...were committed solely against Tutsi 
women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, 
mutilated, and raped several times, often in public…and often by more than 
one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction 
of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. SV was an integral 
part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and 
specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the 
Tutsi group as a whole. [Akayesu Judgement: 174] 
 
It was discovered that many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves, where Tutsi 
women and girls were taken to be killed. Thus, the Chamber also made findings relative 
to Article 2(a) of the ICTR Statute, stating that “in most cases, the rapes of Tutsi 
women…were accompanied by the intent to kill those women” [Judgement: 175]. 
These decisions increased the substantive jurisprudence of SV crimes in conflict as they 
recognised, for the first time, that SV can be a constituent act of genocide. Following 
                                               
29 As listed under Article Two of the ICTR Statute (ICTR, 2010a: 59): 
 Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
51 
 
Akayesu, SV formed part of a genocide conviction in four other cases [Bagosora et al., 
Gacumbitsi, Muhimana and Rutaganda], demonstrating that this breakthrough was not a 
‘one off’ success. 
 
In addition to highlighting the psychological pain that SV inflicts on its victims, with 
specific regard to genocide, the ICTR also recognised the psychological elements of SV 
more generally.  When tasked with defining SV, the Chamber in Akayesu referred to the 
‘UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment’, noting that, like torture, “rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, 
degradation, humiliation, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, 
rape is a violation of personal dignity” [Akayesu Judgement: 65]. 
 
These legal decisions have facilitated the quest for justice for SV victims. By 
successfully indicting, prosecuting and punishing those guilty or responsible for SV, 
acknowledgment has been brought to select SV victims. Within these judgements, the 
ICTR has recognised the gravity and seriousness of SV. The genocide conviction 
entered in Akayesu, in particular, acknowledged SV as an act that can be strategically 
and systematically employed with the intent to destroy a group. These findings have 
contributed to the development of IHL, determining how SV and its victims have been 
recognised in subsequent cases. Furthermore, the ICTR has recognised the severe 
psychological harm that SV offences have brought to victims, which has worked to 
validate and acknowledge victims’ suffering. Yet, while ICTR processes have resulted 
in some degree of recognition-based justice, they have also undermined and inhibited 
such practices in many ways. 
 
Limiting Recognition for Sexual Violence Victims in the ICTR  
The ICTR has established a factual account of what happened during the Rwandan 
genocide, by recording the testimony of victims and witnesses (Gallimore, 2008). 
However, this factual record has been criticised for only telling part of the story. The 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women sent to Rwanda argued that there is a 
great discrepancy “between the reality that women faced during the genocide and the 
present lack of…invisibility…of SV cases before both the international and national 
courts” (Coomaraswamy, 1998: 9). Nowrojee (2005) notes that, given the degree of SV 
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committed throughout the Rwandan genocide, practically every defendant before the 
ICTR should be charged and, where appropriate, convicted of SV. Yet in 2004, on the 
tenth anniversary of the ICTR, a total of 21 judgements had been handed down, with 70 
percent of adjudicated cases containing no SV charges. In the 30 percent of cases that 
included SV charges, only 10 percent resulted in a successful outcome, with the other 
20 percent resulting in an acquittal. In real numbers, that meant than only three 
defendants were held culpable for their role in SV, one of whom was later acquitted on 
appeal (Nowrojee, 2005: 3). This research reveals similar findings (see Appendix I and 
II). By March 2012, the ICTR had handed down 43 judgements, with SV charges being 
laid in 19 of those cases (44 percent). Seven of these cases (16 percent) subsequently 
dropped SV charges before going to court, with nine cases (21 percent) securing a SV 
conviction. However, on appeal, three of these convictions were overturned (seven 
percent), leaving a mere six cases (14 percent) containing SV charges with successful 
outcomes, on top of an additional two cases (five percent) where acts of SV 
underpinned convictions for other crimes (totalling 19 percent overall)
30
. Therefore, of 
the SV cases that made it to trial, almost half resulted in an acquittal. 
 
Although these results show that the record for prosecuting SV crimes has improved 
since Nowrojee’s (2005) report, they reveal that SV charges, and subsequent 
convictions, are still underrepresented in the ICTR. More importantly, these figures 
indicate that SV victims are also underrepresented in the ICTR. As a result, many SV 
victims have been unable to participate on a par with others, and have been denied the 
opportunity to attain justice. Where SV victims have been included in the ICTR crimes 
process, the high acquittal rate has been particularly damaging, as victims and their 
families have been denied recognition because nobody has been held responsible for 
their experiences
31
. Haffajee (2006) argues that this is problematic because acquittals 
put on record that SV did not occur, compromising how SV and its victims are viewed 
at national and international levels. The following sections provide some insight into 
why these trends are apparent, in addition to detailing how the ICTR has worked to 
undermine positive practices of recognition. 
                                               
30 These findings mirror levels of attrition in domestic SV cases (see Triggs, Mossman, Jordan & Kingi, 
2009: 34).  
31 There were eight successful convictions (which includes two cases where SV underpinned convictions 
for other crimes), in comparison to seven acquittals (which includes SV convictions overturned on 
appeal). 
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Institutional Incapacities 
The ICTR has failed to provide recognition for many SV victims due to significant 
institutional incapacities. As a whole, the success of the ICTR has been hampered due 
to obstacles associated with its mandate and location
32
, insufficient funding
33
, limited 
and untrained staff, and a lack of resources
34
 (see Etcheson, 2005: 177; Galina, 2010; 
Nowrojee, 2005; Oosterveld, 2005). Bergsmo & Ling (2012) argue that selecting crimes 
to pursue and the prioritisation of atrocities in ICTs is often strategic and generally 
attributed to the challenge of practically applying limited resources. In line with this 
contention, critics of the ICTR have argued that choosing who to indict and on what 
charge became a strategic decision in the ICTR, where resources were better reserved 
for ‘more serious crimes’ such as genocide, murder, extermination and torture (Galina, 
2010: 15). In particular, Nowrojee (2005) claims that the ICTR has failed to pursue a 
consistent prosecution strategy where SV has been given a high priority
35
. 
 
This might be evidenced when examining cases where SV charges are withdrawn in 
exchange for a guilty plea for other concurrent charges. Balthazar (2006: 48) explains 
that “rape charges seem to be the first to go”. In five of the 23 examined cases, SV 
charges were dropped by the Prosecutor (see Appendix II: Section (iv) for a full 
overview). In Nzabirinda and Bisengimana, SV charges were subsequently withdrawn 
                                               
32 Despite initial support for the establishment of an ICT, Rwanda later voted against SC Resolution 955 
for several reasons, including that the period of time in which the Tribunal covered was deemed 
inadequate, as hostilities began as far back as 1990. The Rwandan Government also opposed the location 
of the Tribunal, in Arusha, Tanzania (SV, 1994d). This location has meant that it has been less accessible 
to victims and their families (Gallimore, 2008). Thus, many victims have been unable to learn what 
happened to their loved ones, share and seek recognition for their personal grievances, or hear 
acknowledgement for the crimes committed (Lambourne, 2009). 
33 From 1995 to 2011, ICTR spending amounted to approximately US$1.7 billion (GA, 2011). Some 
scholars have argued that these appropriations are disproportionate to the success that this Tribunal has 
achieved. Yet, the ICTR and the ICTY have received greater funding than other ICTs, such as those in 
Cambodia or Sierra Leone (see Arsanjani & Reisman, 2005: 402).  
34 Goff (2002: 8) notes that there has a been a severe shortage of technological services and equipment in 
the ICTR, including computers, technology able to digitise judicial archives, as well as limited access to 
electronic databases, all of which have hindered the drafting of indictments (also see Haddad, 2011: 119). 
35Goff (2002), for example, conducted an analysis of trends in SV prosecutions in the ICTR from 
November 1995 to November 2002. In her study, she noted that the Chief Prosecutor’s strategy has 
impacted on how SV crimes have been pursued and prioritised within the ICTR. During Richard 
Goldstone’s two year term of Chief Prosecutor (1994-1996), not a single indictment containing charges of 
SV was brought forward, as rape was not regarded as a prosecutorial priority (Haddad, 2011). However, 
during Louise Arbour’s three year term (1996-1999) in this position, the number of Prosecution files 
containing statements regarding SV significantly increased (Goff, 2002: 5). Yet, Carla De Ponte, the 
Chief Prosecutor to follow, was heavily criticised for her reluctance to prosecute SV crimes during her 
four year term (1999-2003) (Nowrojee, 2005; Haddad, 2011; Haffajee, 2006). SV charges included in 
ICTR indictments dropped from 100 percent in 1999-2000, to 35 percent in 2001-2002 whilst she was in 
office (Goff, 2000: 7). 
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after the defendants entered into a plea bargain with the Prosecutor. Similarly, SV 
charges were dropped in Rugambarara and Serushago because the defendants decided 
to co-operate with the ICTR, and plead guilty to other charges. In Ndindabahizi, SV 
charges were also dropped before the defendant went to trial. 
 
In other cases, the Prosecutor failed to bring SV charges forward despite having 
sufficient evidence. For example, SV charges were not laid in Bikindi (see Appendix II: 
Section (v): Case 19), Mpambara
36
 (see Appendix II: Section (v): Case 21) or 
Nahimana et al. (see Appendix II: Section (v): Case 22) despite clear evidence being 
available. For example, in Nahimana et al., the Prosecutor had ample evidence of SV 
committed against Tutsi women and girls, yet no charges specifically pertaining to SV 
were laid. While the Chamber made SV findings regarding Nahimana’s conviction for 
persecution as a crime against humanity (see Appendix II: Section (v): Case 22), the 
absence of specific SV charges suggests that other crimes took precedence. 
Consequently, it appears that pursuing SV crimes was not a priority for this Prosecutor. 
 
This research indicates that ICTR prosecutors frequently prosecuted SV with 
insufficient or inadequate evidence, thus resulting in high acquittal rates for SV crimes. 
It was often the case that, whilst SV acts were confirmed by the Chamber, there was 
insufficient or inadequate evidence linking the Accused to the acts. For example, in 
Mugenzi et al., there was expert testimony of widespread and systematic SV. However, 
the Chamber ruled that it could not infer knowledge on the part of the defendants of 
these crimes; subsequently, all were acquitted mid-trial [Mugenzi et al. Judgement]. 
Furthermore, in Kajelijeli, the Chamber validated the experiences of: Witness GDO, 
who was stripped and beaten with a club as she watched her six year old handicapped 
daughter being raped; Witness ACM, a Tutsi woman who was raped by Interahamwe at 
the side of a roadblock; and, the rape of Witness GDT and GDF [Kajelijeli Judgement: 
199-200]. However, the Chamber stated that there was insufficient evidence to link 
Kajelijeli to the assaults, resulting in his acquittal concerning all SV charges. Similar 
trends were documented in Bagosora et al., Bikindi, Gacumbitsi and Renzaho. Haddad 
(2011) notes that these trends might be explained by investigative procedures, 
                                               
36 In this case, SV allegations were made under the charge of genocide instead. 
55 
 
especially in instances where investigators have struggled to obtain solid legal and 
evidentiary foundations in SV cases. 
 
For example, Obote-Odora (2005) noted that in the early years of the ICTR, staff 
received minimal training on how to obtain information about widespread and 
systematic violations of IHL. Many investigators were not familiar with the legal 
elements required for crimes they were investigating, and as a result, insufficient 
evidence was often obtained during investigations. In SV cases, these factors prove 
particularly debilitating. Ni Aolain et al. (2011) assert that obtaining information about 
crimes of SV takes a considerable amount of time. Furthermore, the intimate nature of 
SV makes it particularly difficult for SV victims to share their experiences with 
investigators. Unfortunately, the ICTs have often failed to address these issues (see 
Seelinger et al., 2011). Consequently, inexperienced and sometimes insensitive staff 
have worked to keep to strict time frames, employing investigative methods that have 
failed to address these concerns. The lack of sensitivity, in particular, has resulted from 
a dearth of initial resources, including limited female investigators and investigators 
with little or no experience in investigating SV crimes (Nowrojee, 2004; Oosterveld, 
2005). Goff (2002) also notes that the high staff turnover in the ICTR substantially 
increased the difficulty of recruiting staff specialised in gender issues. 
 
In addition, the Tribunal has worked on the presumption that women do not want to talk 
about rape. For example, in an interview with HRW, the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICTR 
explained that “African women don’t want to talk about rape…We haven’t received any 
real complaints. It’s rare in investigations that women refer to rape” (Nowrojee, 1996: 
95). However, Nowrojee (1996) explains that it is not the case that Rwandan women do 
not want to talk about rape, but rather the processes which the ICTR has employed to 
collect SV evidence are flawed. Neuffer (2003: 278), for example, argues that: 
Many found it off-putting when investigators, mostly white males, roared 
into the villages in their white UN Jeeps and then treated the survivors with 
condescension, as if they were stupid rather than traumatised. Taba women 
simply didn’t want to open up to them. 
 
These factors have limited the opportunity for SV victims to secure justice in the ICTR 
crimes process. 
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In many instances, victims and their families have been denied justice as a consequence 
of defective indictments. Defective indictments can be put down to administrative and 
judicial errors, where the Prosecution has failed to accurately plead the material facts of 
the case. This has been particularly problematic, especially when SV cases had been 
confirmed by the Chamber, along with the perpetrator’s involvement, yet legal findings 
could not be made as it would have been unfair to the Accused
37
. In Muhimana, for 
example, the rape of Witness AX was confirmed, but due to the failure of the 
Prosecution to correctly plead the date that she was raped, her testimony could not be 
used to support the allegations made in the indictment. The Chamber noted that the 
Prosecution had failed to provide “the Defence with clear and consistent material facts 
in support of this allegation” [Judgement: 70]. In this same case, the Chamber also ruled 
that it could not make legal findings concerning the rape of Evelyn and Tabita, the rape 
and killing of Therese
38
, the rape of Josephine, the rape of Mukasine and the rape of 
Witness AQ - due to specific material facts not being pleaded in the indictment. These 
trends were also noted in Bagosora et al., Bikindi
39
, Renzaho
40
 and Semanza
41
. 
Administrative errors might be explained by the fact that inexperienced and poorly 
trained staff were forced to work under strict time constraints. 
 
Failing to appeal unsuccessful outcomes related to SV also limited recognition for SV 
victims. For example, in Kajelijeli, an unsuccessful rape conviction went unchallenged 
despite having solid grounds for appeal. The Accused was acquitted of rape and 
                                               
37 As detailed in the Muhimana Case:  
The Accused has a statutory right to be promptly informed in detail of the nature of the 
charges brought against him or her. The Prosecution has an obligation to state the material 
facts underpinning the charges in the indictment... The Prosecution is expected to know its 
case before going to trial. If the Prosecution does not plead the material facts in the 
indictment but includes them in its Pre-Trial Brief or raised them at the trial, it will be 
difficult for the Defence to investigate the new information before the start of the trial. 
[Judgement: 80] 
38 In this incident, a witness confirmed having seen the Accused, who was accompanied by a group of 
men, surround this woman. The witness deduced that this woman was raped and murdered because when 
the men left, she lay on the ground with her throat slit, her skirt torn, and a stick was placed into her 
genitals. However, despite this evidence, the indictment only referred to her murder, and made no 
mention of the rape.  
39 Inconsistencies were noted in the indictment; however, it was ruled that this did not affect the Accused 
in preparing for a defence in regard to the SV allegations.  
40 These errors have meant that SV convictions have been overturned on appeal. In Renzaho, for example, 
the rape of AWO, AWN and AWN’s sister were overturned due to the indictment being rendered 
defective (see Appendix II: Case 8). 
41 The Chamber in Semanza validated the accounts of four prosecution witnesses who had been raped. 
However, the Chamber could not enter a conviction for rape as a crime against humanity in these 
instances, due to the vagueness of the allegations in the indictment. 
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inhumane acts as crimes against humanity by a majority, with one judge dissenting. In 
cases where judges are dissenting, the likelihood of succeeding on appeal is 
significantly increased. Dissenting opinions demonstrate that the judges are divided 
when making a legal judgement (see Lauterpacht, 1996: 66). Judge Ramaroson strongly 
asserted that there was “substantial and specific and corroborative evidence to sustain 
that Kajelijeli committed the crime with which he was charged, and that he is 
responsible for the rapes perpetrated on women” [Kajelijeli Dissenting Opinion: 14]. 
Despite this, the Prosecution team failed to appeal this acquittal. This might also be the 
result of prosecutorial focus and limited resources. 
 
Although the Tribunal has claimed that it does not establish a hierarchy of norms 
[Akayesu Judgement: 122], these examples indicate that SV has been treated as a crime 
of ‘secondary status’ in ICTR proceedings (Galina, 2010; Haddad, 2010; Nowrojee, 
2005). Due to a lack of prosecutorial attention, which has often been attributed to 
limited resources and insufficient or poorly trained staff, the ICTR has not adequately 
responded to SV. Consequently, SV claimants have suffered ‘misrecognition’. 
 
Problems with the Institutional Framework 
Further factors, which have limited recognition for SV victims, are attributed to the 
institutional and cultural framework employed by the ICTR. Nowrojee (2005: 20) 
criticises that: 
Little about the institutional culture of the ICTR places the well-being of the 
genocide victims and witnesses foremost. They are treated as cogs in the 
larger machine rather than placed central to the process. 
 
In support of this contention, the following discussion reveals that serious issues have 
surfaced regarding the conceptualisation of rape. The actus reus (the physical 
components of the crime that need to be proven) has also been heavily disputed, 
particularly where elements of consent versus coercion are concerned. The adversarial 
court process employed by this Tribunal has also been criticised, on the basis that the 
system does little to recognise the needs of victims. This discussion also demonstrates 
that the ICTR has sometimes engaged in discriminatory treatment of SV victims by 
employing practices that are insensitive and inappropriate, and at times, has allowed 
rape myths and sex-biased attitudes to permeate its cultural framework. These 
challenges have been greatly detrimental to the success of the ICTR in terms of how this 
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Tribunal has provided justice for SV victims. Due to these factors, the ICTR has failed 
to acknowledge women’s suffering in a way that has facilitated their recovery and their 
efforts to be empowered. As demonstrated below, these practices have worked to ‘undo’ 
positive practices of recognition. 
 
Defining Sexual Violence 
Cryer, Friman, Robinson & Wilmshurst (2010) argue that the ICTR Statute still reflects 
patriarchal understandings of SV. While rape, enforced prostitution and other 
humiliating and degrading treatment have been recognised as constituting Grave 
Breaches Common to the Geneva Convention (and Additional Protocol II), such acts are 
listed under the category of ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ (ICTR, 2010a: 61). Cryer 
et al. (2010) argue that this harks back to masculine supported perceptions of sex that 
regard rape as a crime against a woman’s honour, a contention that was previously 
explored
42
. Other problems have surfaced in regard to how acts of SV have been 
prosecuted under the ICTR statute. More specifically, the only act of SV explicitly 
condemned under Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute is rape. Although other forms of SV 
have been successfully prosecuted under other applicable categories listed as crimes 
against humanity (such as inhumane acts, persecution and torture), Levy (1994) argues 
that SV should be explicitly defined and condemned under separate and distinct legal 
categories. Without doing so, these violations run the risk of being regarded as 
subsidiary, if not inconsequential human rights abuses. For example, in Rutaganda and 
Nahimana et al., instances of SV underpinned convictions for other crimes (see 
Appendix II: Section (v): Rutaganda and Nahimana et al.), as opposed to being charged 
as separate crimes of SV. 
 
This research also indicates that the ICTR has struggled to provide a consistent 
definition of SV within judicial proceedings. As discussed below, ICTR cases have 
adopted various SV definitions, which is problematic given that when SV definitions 
vary between and across cases, not all instances of SV will be equally and fairly 
considered. Ultimately, differential definitions run the risk of recognising the 
experiences of some victims, whilst failing to recognise the experiences of others. 
                                               
42 The ICC Rome Statute has since omitted the word ‘honour’, instead confirming that “rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy... enforced sterilization, or any other form of SV 
constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” (ICC, 2011:7). 
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Furthermore, the changing of these definitions may also effect a change in the requisite 
actus reus that establishes the crime. Consequently, some SV instances may go 
unrecognised due to strict legal guidelines and subsequent legal interpretation. 
 
Akayesu was the first case that dealt with SV in the ICTR. As rape had no commonly 
accepted definition under international criminal law, the Chamber was tasked with 
defining this act. For reasons that will be explored below, the Chamber defined rape as 
a: 
Physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers SV, which 
includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person 
under circumstances which are coercive. SV is not limited to physical 
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve 
penetration or even physical contact...coercive circumstances need not be 
evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and 
other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute 
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances. [Akayesu 
Judgement: 165] 
 
This definition was notable for three main reasons. First, this broad definition meant 
that other forms of SV, not limited to penetration, could be punished and prosecuted as 
rape. Second, it challenged the mechanical definition of rape that is usually adopted in 
domestic legal proceedings
43
. Lastly, this definition obviated the need to attach 
‘consent’ or ‘lack of consent’ as an actus reus to the crime of rape. With regards to the 
first contention, through broadly defining rape as an invasion of a physical nature, other 
acts not limited to penetration, such as sexual mutilation, could be punishable by the 
Chamber [Akayesu Judgement: 165]. Consequently, the Chamber increased the 
substantive jurisdiction over crimes of rape to include other forms of SV, which created 
greater opportunities for victims’ experiences to be recognised. 
 
Within this definition, the Chamber also recognised that rape was a manifestation of 
aggression, and that the central elements of this crime could not be “captured in a 
mechanical description of objects and body parts” [Akayesu Judgement: 165]. In 
making this finding, the Chamber acknowledged that cultural insensitivities associated 
                                               
43 In particular, in Akayesu, the Chamber argued that although national jurisdictions had historically 
defined rape as non-consensual sexual intercourse, focusing on the mechanical nature of rape (relative to 
the insertion of body parts or other objects), it maintained that such an approach would not suffice in the 
context of international criminal law. 
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with discussing intimate details in public, in combination with the painful unwillingness 
and inability of victims to discuss such graphic anatomical details, made it particularly 
difficult to conform to such a mechanical approach [Akayesu Judgement: 65]. This 
decision was perhaps heavily influenced by the evidence heard throughout the Akayesu 
trial, where the Prosecution and the Defence both tried to obtain explicit mechanical 
descriptions of what happened in instances where witnesses had applied the term 
‘rape’44. These attempts caused great embarrassment and trauma for victims. However, 
in broadly defining SV, the Chamber challenged the need for SV victims to go into 
explicit and arguably unnecessary detail. 
 
Lastly, Akayesu adopted a definition of rape that established coercion as a component of 
the actus reus, rather than consent or lack thereof. ICTs have been heavily criticised for 
their inclination to adopt definitions of rape from national law that focus on the notion 
of consent (see Brouwer, 2005; Grewal, 2010b, 75-78; Schomburg & Peterson, 2007). 
Brouwer (2005), in particular, asserts that the legal definitions of rape employed by 
national jurisdictions were not written for the purpose of adjudicating rape claims in 
IHL. In other words, national definitions of rape founded on principles of consent 
cannot easily be applied to violations that have formed part of a widespread and 
systematic attack against civilians in times of conflict
45
. Therefore, Brouwer (2005: 
428) argues that establishing a lack of consent for SV crimes is irrelevant within the 
international legal context, “especially in light of the violent and repressive context in 
which rapes as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes take place”. These 
same contentions have, at times, been expressed within ICTR proceedings, but with 
little consistency. 
 
                                               
44 For instance, on the request of the Prosecutor in Akayesu, Witness JJ “with great 
embarrassment…explicitly specified that the rapist…penetrated her vagina with his penis” [Judgement: 
107]. Witness NN during cross-examination also had to clarify what she meant by rape, stating “they took 
their ‘sex’ and put it into hers” [Judgement: 111]. 
45 In Furundzija, however, the ICTY Chamber noted that when crimes are not defined in international 
criminal law, national jurisdiction can be used to inform definitions on two conditions. First, the 
international court cannot rely on just one definition applied within a particular national legal system. 
Rather, it must consider references made in all national jurisdictions in order to establish common 
elements of the crime in question. Second, given that international criminal proceedings differ 
significantly from national criminal proceedings, the application of national legal elements needs to be 
approached with caution [Furundzija Judgement: 70]. 
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Like Akayesu, the Chamber in Muhimana
46
, Musema and Niyitegeka employed 
definitions of rape that focused on coercion rather than consent
47
. However, the 
Chamber in Semanza took a step backwards from this broad definition, choosing to 
adopt the definition established in the ICTY Chamber, in Kunarac et al. After reviewing 
national jurisdiction, the Chamber in Kunarac et al. established that rape occurs without 
the consent of the victim
48
 [see Kunarac et al. Judgement: 155-156]. The Chamber in 
Semanza concluded that the Kunarac et al. definition was more persuasive, and 
subsequently noted that “the mental element for rape as a crime against humanity is the 
intention to effect the prohibited sexual penetration with the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of the victim” [Semanza Judgement: 104]. The inclusion of consent 
meant that it became part of the actus reus of the crime
49
. 
 
The subsequent confusion on this issue, led the Prosecution, in the Gacumbitsi Appeals 
Chamber, to seek a clarification of the law pertaining to rape. The Prosecution noted 
that SV only fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction when such acts occurred in the 
context of genocide, armed conflict, or a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population, “circumstances where genuine consent is impossible” [Gacumbitsi 
Appeal Judgement: 55]. Consequently, the Prosecution argued that rape should be 
treated the same as any other violation of IHL, and that these circumstances negate the 
need for the Prosecution to establish knowledge of a lack of consent in the actus reus. 
Instead, consent should be considered as an affirmative defence under Rule 96
50
 
                                               
46 In Muhimana, the Chamber noted that “circumstances prevailing in most cases charged under 
international criminal law, as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, will be almost 
universally coercive, thus vitiating true consent” [Muhimana Judgement: 100].  
47 These judgements also argued against including a mechanical description of body parts in the definition 
of rape, which is relevant due to reasons already discussed.  
48 The ICTY Appeals Chamber justified the inclusion of consent on the basis that there “are factors other 
than force which would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntarily on the part 
of the victim”  [Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement: 39]. 
49 Furthermore, by applying such a restrictive approach, focused on sexual penetration, the Chamber 
subsequently limited the possibility of trying other SV crimes as rape However, to its credit it did 
recognise that other SV acts “may be prosecuted as other crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction 
of this tribunal such as torture, persecution, enslavement, or other inhumane acts” [Semanza Judgement: 
104]. 
50 Rule 96 Clause (ii) and (iii) concern issues pertaining to consent and stipulate that: 
(ii) Consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim:  
(a) Has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, 
detention or psychological oppression; or 
(b) Reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, 
threatened or put in fear. 
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[Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement: 55]. Despite the validity of such contentions, the 
Chamber deemed it necessary to include non-consent in the actus reus for crimes of 
rape
51
. The Chamber in Kajelijeli, Renzaho [Judgement: 206] and Kamuhanda 
[Judgement: 121] also applied this restrictive approach. 
 
Thus, although the burden of proving non-consent in the Akayesu definition was 
deemed unnecessary by the Chamber, this once dominant definition seems to have been 
replaced by the definition employed in Kunarac et al. above; a definition which has 
maintained the necessity of establishing non-consent in the actus reus of the crime of 
rape. In this respect, it might be argued that SV is not treated on a par with other 
violations, as these crimes need not establish a lack of consent in order to constitute 
crimes of IHL. After all, it would be ludicrous to suggest that anyone might consent to 
torture, let alone genocide, in times of conflict. 
 
Brouwer (2005) argues that rape in conflict almost always takes place in coercive 
circumstances, which is evidenced by all ICTR and ICTY cases involving rape to date. 
Furthermore, acts of SV or rape can only be prosecuted as genocide, or as crimes 
against humanity, if such acts are committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population, indicating the existence of coercion (Brouwer, 
2005). Therefore, the inclusion of consent in the legal definition of rape seems 
completely unwarranted. By detailing that the notion of consent in legal definitions 
needs to be fulfilled, victims may be subject to painful and humiliating questions 
regarding consent, which are irrelevant given the circumstances in which these crimes 
have taken place (Brouwer, 2005). By failing to accurately reflect the reality in which 
crimes of SV take place, ICTs run the risk of silencing SV victims (Brouwer, 2005), 
thus limiting their opportunity to attain recognition-based justice. 
 
Problems with the Adversarial Court System 
Mertus’ (2004) research reveals that many victims hold the belief that giving testimony 
to crimes in ICTs will help them move forward with their lives. In particular, many 
                                                                                                                                         
(iii) Before evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy the 
Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible. (ICTR, 2010b: 
115).  
51 The Chamber stated that: “the Prosecution can prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt by proving 
the existence of coercive circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible” [Gacumbitsi 
Appeal Judgement: 56]. 
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victims hope that, upon attaining public recognition for the harms committed against 
them and bringing their perpetrators to account, they can put their lives back together. 
However, many victims have been disappointed with the adversarial court process and 
its ability to deliver justice in a way that meets such expectations (Mertus, 2004). As 
this research reveals, a lack of sensitivity towards SV and its victims has proven greatly 
detrimental to ICTR prosecutions. As discussed above, ICTs have sometimes failed to 
satisfactorily take into account issues pertaining to the reality and seriousness of SV and 
the respectful treatment of its victims within court proceedings (Brouwer, 2005: 453). 
Consequently, SV victims have often been subjected to secondary victimisation within 
the courtroom (Askin, 2005; Coomaraswamy, 2005; Franke, 2006; Henry, 2009; Ni 
Aolain et al., 2011), which has worked to ‘undo’ positive practices of recognition. 
 
As previously identified, the way in which ICTs have been structured has worked to 
silence SV experiences, as well as other victims’ experiences. Most notably, adversarial 
court systems concentrate on affirming ‘facts’, and as such, can limit the role of the 
victim. For example, in Kajelijeli, the Chamber heard the testimony of Witness GDO 
who relayed evidence of the rape and murder of her 15 year old handicapped daughter, 
along with her own assault (see appendix II: Section (iii): Case 11). While the testimony 
of this witness was deemed credible insofar as her daughter was raped and killed by 
Interahamwe, there was reasonable doubt as to whether Kajelijeli was present at the 
scene due to inconsistencies between the witness’s written statements and her trial 
testimony. In her written statement, she located Kajelijeli a distance of 50 metres from 
where the crime had been perpetrated, and noted that the crime occurred at 4am. 
However, on cross-examination she stated that she did not know how to estimate 
distance in metres, and recalled the assault to have taken place early in the morning
52
. 
Establishing these sorts of ‘facts’ can be a difficult process for victims, as it means they 
are unable to describe their experiences in their own words (Henry, 2009). The focus on 
literal facts, such as the distance in metres in which the Accused stood, and the time at 
                                               
52 Combs (2009: 243-246) observes that victims often have difficulties estimating distance, due to a lack 
of ability, or they are incapable of applying their understanding of distance to western measurement 
frameworks (such as recording distance in metres). Duration estimates and numerical estimates also prove 
difficult for victims (Combs, 2009). This is problematic given that accurate accounts of establishing these 
details are of crucial importance to establishing the ‘facts’ of a given case. Consequently, legal teams may 
try and get distances and other factual details through showing maps, pictures or lengths (Combs, 2009). 
However, this is not always understood by victims, and can undermine a victim’s testimony, as in this 
example. 
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which the act was perpetrated, restricts the manner in which victims are able to share 
their stories (Dembour & Arbour, 2004). 
 
Related to this point is the unnecessary trauma caused to SV victims on having to 
conform to a mechanical definition of rape (as discussed above). In having to discuss 
the mechanical nature of rape (describing which body part went where), SV victims 
become almost invisible in the legal process. Bumiller (2008: 46), for example, asserts 
that: 
The legal definition of rape in the courtroom diminishes her voice in 
contrast to the overwhelming presence of her body. She is a voiceless form 
or a mechanical woman. Without the victim’s voice, the power of 
interpretation belongs to the law’s vision of sexual crime. The legal filter of 
relevancy erases her own experiences from a retelling of events that focuses 
on men’s transgression against her body. 
 
For example, in Akayesu, Witness NN recalled how she was brutally raped alongside 
her sister, after their house was destroyed by their Hutu neighbours. Her father and her 
brother had been murdered in the process. She explained that her mother had pleaded 
with the two men, armed with bludgeons and machetes, to kill her and her sister rather 
than rape them in front of her. One of the men replied that the “principle was to make 
them suffer”, and then she and her sister were raped [Akayesu Judgement: 109]. On 
cross-examination, Witness NN had to confirm “that the man who raped her penetrated 
her vagina with his penis”, to which she then added that “he did it in an ‘atrocious’ 
manner, mocking and taunting her” [Judgement: 110]. Witness NN’s testimony is 
particularly harrowing. However, the Chamber was more focused on establishing the 
facts, in order to determine whether the crime of rape had been committed. In order to 
do so, the Chamber had to ‘filter’ the relevant pieces of information, subsequently 
choosing to focus on and get her to describe the transgression against her body using 
explicit reference to ‘penis’, ‘penetration’ and ‘vagina’. Thus, this witness was also 
unable to tell her story in her own words; instead her testimony was chopped, refined 
and made legally digestible, so that it could conform to the legal anti-narrative (Mertus, 
2004: 113). 
 
Other problems within the adversarial system (and how it operates) can be located in 
methods of cross-examination, as well as the conduct of ICT staff. As previously 
discussed, there have been many problems with ICTs in terms of the evident power 
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imbalances between female witnesses and lawyers in the adversarial court system. 
Henry (2009) acknowledges that this imbalance is often recognised in methods of cross-
examination, where Defence lawyers can use manipulative and insensitive cross-
examination strategies in determining the credibility of a witness. During the ICTR trial 
proceedings, SV victims were sometimes asked difficult, unnecessary or inappropriate 
questions. For example, in Akayesu, several victims were asked questions concerning 
“where the rapes took place”, “how many rapists there were”, and “how old they were 
at the time of the assault” [Akayesu Judgement: 117]. However, the Defence also asked 
“which rapists used condoms” [Akayesu Judgement: 117]. Such questions seemed 
unnecessary given that they are irrelevant to establishing that these rapes occurred
53
. 
 
Another example was highlighted in the Butare et al. case
54
. In this case, a woman, who 
testified to being raped multiple times during the genocide, was asked inappropriate and 
degrading questions by the Defence, including “did you touch the Accused’s penis”, 
“how was it introduced into your vagina”, and “were you injured in the process of being 
raped by nine men”55 (Nowrojee, 2007: 130). To add further disrespect, the Defence 
implied that she could not have been raped as she had not taken a bath that day, and 
subsequently smelled, to which the judges burst into laughter (Nowrojee, 2007). This 
victim later told Nowrojee (2007) that most of her family were killed during the 
genocide, but she had survived. She expressed that: 
To answer the strange questions asked by the ICTR...If you say you were 
raped that is understandable. How many times do you need to say it? When 
the judges laughed, they laughed like they could not stop laughing. I was 
angry and nervous. (Nowrojee, 2007: 130) 
 
This example clearly demonstrates that some ICTR staff members have shown a lack of 
respect and professionalism. This is not an isolated incident. 
 
                                               
53 In 2010, the ICTR amended the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 90, to include clause (g), which 
confirmed that “cross-examination shall be limited to the subject-matter of the evidence-in-chief and 
matters affecting the credibility of the witness and, where the witness is able to give evidence relevant to 
the case for the cross-examining part, to the subject matter of the case” (ICTR, 2010b: 103).  
54 This case is on appeal, and subsequently not included in the rest of this research. Nonetheless, it is 
important to acknowledge, given the severe mis-treatment of one particular rape victim by a Defence 
lawyer, as well as the presiding judges.  
55 Peskin (2008: 200) notes that there have been longstanding difficulties associated with the ICTR 
judiciary, especially in its many failed attempts to “control and hasten” courtroom proceedings. Butare et 
al. is one example where judges failed in their efforts to caution the Defence in regards to inappropriate 
questioning. 55In 2010, the ICTR amended the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 90, to include 
clause (f), which stipulated that the “Chamber shall exercise control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence” (ICTR, 2010b: 103).  
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In Akayesu, although not a SV victim herself, Witness J testified to witnessing her six 
year old daughter being raped when three Interahamwe came to kill her father. In his 
closing argument, the Defence lawyer used the example of Witness J to demonstrate the 
dishonesty of Prosecution witnesses. The Defence recalled that despite being six months 
pregnant, the witness was able to climb a tree and stay up the tree all week without 
food, in “her condition”. The Defence went on to characterise the victim’s testimony as 
“fantasy”, stating that this “fantasy” is of “interest to psychologists and not justice” 
[Akayesu Judgement: 118]. The witness challenged his suggestion by stating “if 
somebody was chasing you, you would be able to climb a tree” [Akayesu Judgement: 
118]. Such an insensitive personal attack shows little regard for the victim and the 
experiences she endured throughout the genocide. These examples demonstrate that, at 
times, Tribunal staff have behaved in ways which have subjected victims to unnecessary 
trauma. Due to such factors, Brouwer (2005) argues that in conflict, where rapes are 
systematic and often strategically adopted, an aggressive common law strategy of cross-
examination is not appropriate. 
 
The Institutional Construction of Rape Myths 
This research has also revealed that the ICTR has allowed for stereotypes and rape 
myths to pervade judicial proceedings. Rape myths are defined as “prejudicial, 
stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims and rapists” (Burt, 1980: 217). 
Temkin & Krahe (2008) argue that stereotypical beliefs and attitudes about SV, its 
victims and its perpetrators, can affect the judgements of individuals who are involved 
at each stage of the legal decision making process. They assert that the belief in rape 
myths, and other misconceptions about SV, serves to undermine the seriousness of SV 
through attributing blame to the victim, while exonerating the perpetrator (Temkin & 
Krahe, 2008). Problematically, attitudes and false misconceptions about SV can lead to 
higher attrition rates (see Bower, Eysell, Pina & Siebler, 2009), which can limit the 
possibility for recognition in judicial processes. 
 
Moreover, SV victims are often confronted with disbelief, blame and a lack of empathy 
due to such stereotypical beliefs (Temkin & Krahe, 2008). This research identified 
several rape myths and other sexed stereotypes which were evident in SV cases 
including: only chaste, virginal women can be true victims of rape; rapists act on 
uncontrollable sexual urges; pretty or beautiful women invite rape; and, all women 
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should be able to resist rape (Bower, Esyell, Pina, Siebler & Vicki, 2009). These 
examples will be examined and explored below. 
 
The first myth examined in ICTR proceedings harks back to the traditional belief that 
only chaste, virginal women warrant legal protection from the law. Wykes & Welsh 
(2008) argue that prior sexual history was commonly used in national courts to discredit 
the testimony of a rape victim, and undermine her right to legal protection
56
. This myth 
was examined in Rukondo. When prompted on cross-examination, Witness CHH 
revealed that she was not sexually active at the time of being raped [Rukondo: 112]. 
Rule 96 (IV) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates that prior sexual 
conduct of the victim shall not be admitted as evidence or as a defence in trial 
proceedings (ICTR, 2010b: 115). Yet in this case, the victim’s virginity was made 
explicitly clear. This demonstrates the existence of a double standard, as evidence 
regarding her lack of prior sexual contact was likely admitted in an effort to validate and 
support the ‘believability’ of this crime. 
Another myth to pervade ICTR proceedings was the ‘pressure cooker’ theory of SV, a 
belief founded on the assumption that rape is the result of men acting out uncontrollable 
sexual urges and their need to fulfil sexual fantasies (Seifert, 1994). This popular and 
effective myth has been discredited by studies that have revealed that “rape is not an 
aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation of aggression” 
(Seifert, 1994: 55). Yet, during the Akayesu trial, an expert Defence witness named 
Matata, expressed his view that: 
Rapists were more interested in satisfying their physical needs, that there 
were spontaneous acts of desire even in the context of killing. Tutsi women, 
in general, are quite beautiful and that raping them is not necessarily 
intended to destroy an ethnic group, but rather to have a beautiful woman. 
[Akayesu Judgement: 113] 
 
Not only did his view seem to suggest that men wished to fulfil their sexual desires and 
were, thus, driven to rape women as a result of their sexual urges (a view consistent 
with the ‘pressure cooker’ theory), but his view might be interpreted to mean that only 
beautiful women were targeted for rape throughout the genocide. The first view 
attempts to undermine the seriousness of SV, which is especially problematic given the 
                                               
56 Such perceptions also hark back to IHL provisions which described rape as an attack on a woman’s 
‘honour’, as discussed above. This term was constituted on the basis of certain sexual characteristics 
which needed protecting, namely the chastity and modesty of women. 
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wider context in which SV occurred throughout the Rwandan genocide
57
. The latter 
view seems to support the myth that attractive women provoke rape through their 
appearance (Hartman & Jackson, 1994). This is noteworthy, given that this testimony 
attempts to shift a sense of responsibility to the victim, which, in turn, works to 
minimise the responsibility of the perpetrator (Temkin & Krahe, 2008). Problematically, 
the Chamber failed to mention that such views hold no place in the courtroom. 
 
The last myth examined in ICTR proceedings is related to the theme of resistance. 
Resistance often caters to ‘real rape’ stereotypes, particularly when victims have had to 
explain why they were incapable of resisting sexual assault within legal proceedings.  
Although courts have modified legal provisions pertaining to rape, obviating the need 
for the Prosecution to prove a lack of consent through physical resistance
58
, these 
changes seem to have had little impact on court proceedings (McSherry, 1998). 
McSherry (1998: 30) argues that the easiest way to prove lack of consent is through 
establishing that the victim physically resisted the attack. Furthermore, a rape victim is 
often deemed more credible in court if she physically resists the attack (Temkin & 
Krahe, 2008). However, her reasons for not resisting such an attack may be deemed 
more understandable in the presence of a weapon (see Morash, 2005: 133). 
 
The theme of resistance and, the reasons why victims could not resist, were documented 
throughout this research. In Kajelijeli, Witness GTD testified that she was taken by 
Interahamwe to a nearby river where they then pushed her down, spread her legs and 
began to rape her. According to the judgement: 
All these people took their turns inserting their sexual organs in her sexual 
organ…The Witness could not resist because the Interahamwe were armed, 
and even if she was armed, the Witness thought a weapon would be useless. 
[Kajelijeli Judgement: 140]. 
 
The presence of weapons was also reported in other instances.  Witness JJ “explicitly 
specified that the rapist, a young man with a long knife, penetrated her vagina with his 
penis” [Akayesu Judgement: 107]. Furthermore, Mukasine testified that “Muhimana 
had hit her with the butt of his gun and parted her legs before forcibly raping her” 
                                               
57 As discussed above, SV formed part of a systematic and widespread attack against women and girls. It 
was used to humiliate and terrorise them, and in some instances, was strategically and consciously 
employed as a weapon, to bring about the destruction of the Tutsi as a group. 
58 In Akayesu for example, the Chamber ruled that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by 
show of physical force” [Judgement: 165]. 
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[Muhimana Judgement: 47]. Such information appears to have been presented in order 
to add greater impact with regards to the believability of the crime, enhance the 
credibility of the victim and prove their lack of consent. However, the inclusion of such 
evidence can serve to satisfy the myth that all women are capable of resisting rape, 
except in cases where perpetrators are armed with a weapon. Furthermore, it serves the 
belief that if a victim does not resist rape, she has consented to it. 
 
To summarise, problems with the ICTR’s institutional framework have seriously 
compromised the recognition that SV victims have received. As argued throughout, the 
ICTR has failed to consistently define SV in a way that has adequately captured the 
reality of this crime, instead choosing to adopt a conceptual framework that focuses on 
consent as an actus reus. Furthermore, the adversarial system has worked to silence and 
undermine the testimony of SV victims, through employing methods that have failed to 
meet their expectations. Most notably, the ICTR has prevented victims from retelling 
their experiences in their own words. Moreover, at times, ICTR staffs have questioned 
victims in a hostile and insensitive manner, subjecting them to unnecessary 
victimisation. The existence of rape myths and other sexed stereotypes has also 
inhibited practices of recognition. As discussed above, such views function to 
undermine the seriousness of SV by attributing blame to the victim, in an attempt to 
exonerate the perpetrator. 
 
Problems with Participation 
In addition to the issues explored above, the ICTR has also presented problems which 
have inhibited the participation of SV victims. The most significant achievement which 
has encouraged victim participation in the ICTR, has been the special measures 
undertaken to ensure the protection of victims and witnesses by establishing a VWSS. 
This unit was established in July 1995, in an effort to ensure the psychological 
wellbeing and safety of all victims and witnesses (ICTR, 2012). Witnesses have 
benefited from a range of special measures including, but not limited to: the use of 
pseudonyms; non-disclosure of their identity unless required by the defence for trial 
preparation; image or voice altering devices; the option to testify behind a screen; and 
the option to testify via closed circuit television (ICLS, n.d: 16). Although well 
intentioned, the ICTR’s VWSS has sometimes been ineffective. For example, Goff 
(2002) notes that victims and witnesses have still been confronted with harassment, 
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intimidation and, in serious instances, attempted murder. In addition, names have been 
leaked back to Rwanda, meaning that some victims and witnesses have been afraid to 
return to their homes due to fear of reprisal after their testimony (Brouwer, 2005). 
Consequently, many SV victims interviewed by the Special Rapporteur expressed that 
they did not have confidence in the protection scheme and, therefore, chose not to use 
their services (Coomaraswamy, 1998). 
 
Furthermore, Nowrojee (2005) argues that the ICTR has failed to address concerns of 
post-trial protection. She notes that there is little follow-up to ensure that witnesses are 
safe and protected after the trial is complete. Post-trial protection is often viewed as a 
responsibility to be undertaken by national governments, not an issue for ICTs. 
However, these issues are rarely addressed by national governments. Nowrojee (2005) 
suggests that there needs to be coordinated effort between ICTs and national 
governments to ensure that victims can benefit from post-trial protection. Without the 
guarantee of post-trial protection, victims may be discouraged from coming forward to 
give testimony, which can limit the opportunity to attain recognition-based justice. 
These factors are problematic because, if victims feel they are unsafe, they will be 
reluctant to participate in judicial processes
59
. 
 
The ICTR also has no process to deal with the shame and stigma that SV brings to 
victims. The difficulties associated with disclosing information about SV has 
significantly limited participation, or willingness to participate. Perhaps the biggest 
issue is related to deeply entrenched stereotypes that exist within wider society. For 
example, the Fourth Annual Report of the ICTR indicates that investigative teams 
interviewed 360 SV victims in 1998, yet only 85 witness statements were taken as 
evidence (SC, 1999: 13). These figures may indicate that women are reluctant to testify 
in the ICTR due to the fear that they will be rejected and stigmatised by their family, as 
and the wider community (Goff, 2002). However, as argued above, this may also be 
indicative of poor training and skills of staff employed to investigate SV crimes. 
Brouwer (2005) details that name leaking in the ICTR has proven problematic in this 
respect, especially when the names of SV victims have been leaked in Rwanda. She 
recalls one example, where a woman’s fiancé left her after discovering that she was a 
                                               
59 For a full and comprehensive overview of the Protection and Safety measures undertaken by the ICTR, 
see Mahony (2010: 59-76). 
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SV victim who had testified in Arusha
60
 (Brouwer, 2005: 255). These factors are strong 
deterrents against participating in the ICTR crimes process, thus limiting opportunities 
to attain recognition. 
 
As identified in Chapter Three, existing social and economic deprivations can also 
exclude minority groups from participating in justice institutions from the outset, as 
disadvantaged individuals do not have the means to freely participate (Ni Aolain et al., 
2011). Structural disadvantages suffered by women have limited how SV victims have 
been represented in the ICTR crimes process. In the Rwandan context, structural 
disadvantage underpinned by socio-cultural values of gender has proven debilitating for 
women seeking recognition-based justice. Before the genocide, African Unity (2000: 
161) described Rwanda as a patriarchal society, where the unwritten laws of Rwandan 
custom and tradition regarded women as “second class citizens”. Like patterns of 
inequality identified on a global scale, Rwandan women are disadvantaged by social, 
political and economic forces, subsequently limiting their role in everyday society (see 
Newbury & Baldwin, 2000). 
 
The literature demonstrates that these structural disadvantages have only been 
exacerbated in the aftermath of genocide. Following the genocide, all Rwandans, 
particularly women, were faced with severe social, political and economic challenges 
(Newbury & Baldwin, 2000). Many families went without food, healthcare, education 
and housing
61
, placing a large burden on women who were left to care for their children, 
as well as distant relatives who survived the genocide. Goff (2007) argues that SV 
victims have required immediate socio-economic assistance in order to ensure their 
survival, and these needs have taken primary importance over attaining legal justice and 
recognition for the harms committed against them. Henry (2009: 120) bluntly states that 
many victims are “investing energy into survival and economic stability with little 
regard to the relative ‘luxury’ of legal justice”. However, even when victims have 
considered legal justice a priority, the location of the Tribunal proved problematic as 
possible witnesses were unable to testify due to work commitments. Some witnesses 
                                               
60 Sharratt’s (2011) research, however, reveals that male family relatives have usually supported their 
female family members in their pursuit for justice. 
61 Inheritance laws in Rwanda saw that women could not gain access to property or land unless they were 
explicitly designated as a beneficiary of the estate. This meant that many women had no legal claim to the 
land or bank accounts of their murdered husbands or relatives (African Unity, 2000) 
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had no option but to pull out of their pursuit for justice, especially given that the 
Tribunal did not offer expenses (Obote-Odora, 2005). 
 
To conclude, by employing special measures that have worked to protect and support 
witnesses and victims, the ICTR has assisted some SV victims in their quest for justice. 
However, these measures have been fairly limited and have not always counteracted the 
problems which prohibited participation in the first place.  Furthermore, due to 
significant structural disadvantages, many victims have been unable to participate in 
ICTR proceedings, meaning that they have had no personal experience of ‘truth’ and 
acknowledgement. 
 
Securing and Limiting Redistributive Justice 
As already established, ICTs have largely failed to recognise issues concerned with 
redistributive justice. Drawing on previous observations, this discussion of 
redistributive justice will focus on practices of reparation. After all, forms of reparation 
are concerned with issues of restitution, compensation and satisfaction (Gillard, 2003). 
ICTs can play an important part in satisfactory reparation, especially when harms are 
formally recognised and acknowledged by the courts. This process of recognition can 
facilitate the redistribution of power by redefining power imbalances evident between 
perpetrator and victim. The ICTR has offered some level of satisfactory reparation 
where SV is concerned, by successfully indicting, prosecuting and punishing those 
guilty or responsible for such acts. Yet, the potential to ‘do’ redistributive justice in this 
sense has sometimes been undermined, especially when victims have felt re-victimised 
by the courts, or where ‘insufficient’ sentences have been handed to SV perpetrators62. 
 
In light of other forms of reparation, the ICTR has failed to adequately respond to 
victims’ needs where restitution and compensation are concerned (see African Rights & 
Redress, 2011). Restitution, as defined by the UN (2010: 40, 47), is “the re-
establishment of the situation before the wrongful act was committed”, whereas 
compensation is defined as “economically accessible damage”. Gillard (2003) notes that 
these forms of reparation can be a practical and important part of addressing the 
consequences that IHL violations cause to victims. As identified in Chapter One, in the 
                                               
62See Brouwer (2005: 443-447), Nowrojee (2005) and Seelinger et al. (2011: 52-54) for an overview on 
sentencing practices in the ICTR.  
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wake of SV violations committed in Rwanda, victims required urgent medical and 
psychological care. Women were also faced significant economic burdens due to the 
loss of property and assets. Many women lost their main source of income, following 
the deaths of their husbands. These difficulties were further intensified, because many 
women were unable to work following SV. However, due to institutional limits, as well 
as a lack of institutional resources, many SV victims have been forced to cope with 
these challenges on their own (Porter, 2007). 
 
While the ICTR has provided medical and psychological support to victims who have 
testified, this support has been limited to their stay at the Tribunal (see Brouwer, 2005; 
Chifflet, 2003). Moreover, such support does not reach those victims who stand outside 
the ICTR crimes process (Brouwer, 2005). Thus, calls for the UN to address the need of 
compensation and restitution have been pressed by non-governmental organisations, 
and other organisations working with genocide survivors (see African Rights & 
Redress, 2011). These requests, however, have also been made by the ICTR. In 2002, 
the then President of the ICTR, Navanethem Pillay, noted that “compensation for 
victims is essential if Rwanda is to recover from the genocidal experience” (Pillay, 
2002: 1). She submitted a proposal to the UN Secretary-General in 2000, which argued 
that genocide victims should be compensated (Pillay, 2002). Within this proposal she 
referred to the ‘Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power’, as discussed in the previous chapter, which states that victims of 
wrongful acts should be entitled to restitution, compensation and other forms of 
assistance for the injuries they have suffered (see GA, 1985). In acknowledgment of this 
report, the ICTR Judges indicated their support for compensation, but argued that 
compensation and restitution were issues that should be addressed by domestic courts 
(SC, 2000b). 
 
This attitude has governed how the ICTR has addressed issues of compensation and 
restitution. Within the ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 105 and 106 
pertain to principles of restitution and compensation (ICTR, 2010b). In particular, Rule 
106 stipulates that victims seeking compensation against a perpetrator convicted by the 
ICTR must apply to a national court or other competent body in order to pursue claims 
of compensation (ICTR, 2010b: 121). However, Survivor’s Fund (2012) argues that, 
due to a lack of funds, Rwandan courts have not paid any compensation. Despite this, 
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no changes have been made to assist survivors in obtaining compensation within the 
ICTR framework (Survivors Fund, 2012). 
 
A senior staff member of Ibuka, an umbrella organisation for survivor organisations in 
Rwanda, details that “the ICTR spends the equivalent of $500,000 (US) each year, but 
we do not see any corresponding gains for the survivors who are seeking justice” (cited 
in African Rights & Redress, 2008: 57). In this respect, it might be questioned if the 
money injected into the ICTR would be better reserved for responding to the immediate 
needs and challenges that all rights violations victims face in the aftermath of systematic 
violence. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that, whilst the ICTR has recognised SV and its victims by 
successfully indicting, prosecuting and punishing some perpetrators responsible for 
these heinous acts, SV crimes have often been constructed and responded to in ad hoc 
and skewed ways. This chapter details that, in the early years of the ICTR, SV crimes 
went largely unrecognised and unaccounted for. Due to institutional incapacities, in 
combination with a lack of political will, the Tribunal reserved its time and resources 
for the investigation and prosecution of ‘more serious’ crimes, such as murder, torture, 
extermination and genocide. Although there has been some improvement, this chapter 
revealed that SV and its victims are still largely underrepresented in the ICTR crimes 
process. As demonstrated above, the number of indictments containing SV charges is 
still relatively low. Furthermore, in cases where SV charges have been successfully 
included in indictments, almost half have resulted in an acquittal. 
 
This chapter also details that there were significant problems concerning the 
institutional framework of the ICTR. This chapter demonstrates that the ICTR has 
conceptualised crimes of SV in a skewed way, adopting definitions which have 
inadequately captured the reality and lived experiences of SV victims. The adversarial 
court process has also limited victim participation and has functioned to silence and 
marginalise victims’ testimonies in favour of a legal narrative. Not only this, but 
methods of cross examination have also proved problematic, especially when Tribunal 
staff have exercised little regard for victims providing testimony, by asking unnecessary 
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and difficult questions, and making insensitive and inappropriate remarks in trial 
proceedings. At times, sex-biased and harmful stereotypes have also permeated the 
cultural framework of the ICTR. These practices have subsequently undermined 
positive practices of recognition by subjecting women to unwarranted and unnecessary 
victimisation. 
 
Victim participation in the ICTR has also been fairly limited, for a number of reasons, 
including weak and ineffective safety and protection sections, as well as significant 
structural disadvantages. Last of all, this chapter highlights that the successes of the 
ICTR in providing recognition for some victims, have been undermined by their failure 
to address issues concerned with redistribution, particularly in the form of 
compensation. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Although SV committed during conflict affects men, women and children, it 
disproportionately affects women and girls. Upon recognising this, Chapter Two argued 
that SV committed against women and girls can be linked to global systemic patterns of 
gender discrimination. In particular, this chapter highlighted that the development of 
socio-cultural values has worked to sustain the dominant gendered social order. 
Violence against women can be regarded as an extension of such norms and ideologies, 
which have worked to keep women subordinated within society. At the same time, 
‘status disparities’ marked by gender have affected how women have accessed justice, 
or made justice claims within international legal institutions. More specifically, these 
institutions have mirrored socio-cultural norms that have regarded women as 
unimportant, subsequently excluding them, or rendering them invisible within social 
interactions (Fraser, 2007b). Due to the male-centric construction of international 
institutions, SV during conflict failed to garner legal recognition until the 1990s. 
Consequently, most SV acts committed against women during conflict went 
unrecognised and unpunished in international legal proceedings. 
 
Nonetheless, the UN acknowledged SV committed against women as a serious concern 
following the SV atrocities that were widely documented throughout the former 
Yugoslavia. Following its establishment of the ICTY, the first ever ICT to deal 
exclusively with SV crimes, the UN has continued to develop and strengthen principles 
of IHL condemning the practice of SV in other established ICTs. In doing so, the UN 
has created new opportunities for women to attain justice within international legal 
justice institutions. However, for justice to be meaningful, these institutions must 
adequately address the needs, expectations and experiences of those affected by 
repressive violence (Lambourne, 2009; Porter, 2007). Recognising the importance of 
such contentions, this thesis employed Nancy Fraser’s (2007a) theoretical model based 
on recognition, redistributive and representative notions of justice, and considered how 
justice has been secured for SV victims in ICTs. Although the nature of this research 
skewed the research findings in favour of how ICTs have secured recognition-based 
justice, issues associated with redistribution and representation were also considered 
important. 
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This thesis has shown that, although SV crimes have been defined and criminalised 
under IHL, allowing for some level of recognition for SV victims within ICTs, the 
male-centred core of these institutions has remained intact. In particular, operational 
issues apparent within these Tribunals have worked to limit and undermine positive 
practices of recognition-based justice. Due to institutional incapacities, ICTs cannot, 
and do not, prosecute all SV cases where evidence exists (UN, 2010). However, one 
might expect that SV crimes would still be rigorously pursued and treated on a par with 
other rights violations. Yet, research demonstrates that SV cases, and SV victims, are 
underrepresented in ICT processes. In particular, these institutions demonstrate a lack of 
political will in their efforts to rigorously investigate and prosecute SV within 
international legal proceedings. Instead, ICTs have been primarily focused on 
prosecuting more ‘serious crimes’, such as genocide, murder and torture (Galina, 2010; 
Nowrojee, 2005). Furthermore, ICTs have perpetuated sex-stereotyped views and have 
allowed for discriminatory practices against women to occur. The adversarial court 
system has also proved problematic, as SV victims, along with victims generally, are 
not considered central to court processes. They have instead been treated as “cogs in the 
larger machine” (Nowrojee, 2005: 20). 
 
ICTs have also failed to address concerns of redistribution. In particular, ICTs have 
failed to address victims’ needs in relation to reparation, compensation and restitution, 
which has prolonged and reinforced their suffering. Stanley (2009) indicates that 
victims regard recognition and redistributive justice as interconnected. On this premise, 
without measures that address redistributive injustices, the success of international 
mechanisms is seriously compromised. As this thesis demonstrates, SV victims face 
many debilitating physical, psychological and socio-economic consequences in the 
wake of their violation.  The failure to redress and respond to these needs has meant that 
SV victims have been further disadvantaged. Furthermore, while ICTs have encouraged 
the participation of victims within ICT proceedings, particularly upon establishing 
protection and support units, these efforts have been limited and largely ineffective. 
 
Chapter Four consolidated these contentions, presenting the research findings obtained 
from the critical examination of ICTR cases concerning SV. The analysis demonstrated 
that while the ICTR has facilitated SV victims in their quest for recognition-based 
justice by successfully defining, prosecuting and punishing some individuals guilty of 
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SV, SV crimes have been constructed and responded to in ad hoc and skewed ways. 
Hampered by institutional factors including limited and untrained staff, insufficient 
resources, and strict time frames, the ICTR closed down opportunities for SV victims to 
attain recognition-based justice. In particular, the number of SV cases processed by the 
ICTR failed to adequately capture the reality of SV suffered by women and girls 
throughout the Rwandan genocide. This research revealed that just under half of all SV 
cases pursued resulted in an unsuccessful outcome, leaving a meagre six successful 
outcomes. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis showed that problems with the ICTR’s institutional 
framework limited and undermined positive practices of recognition. The 
conceptualisation of SV, particularly when it has been founded on the burden of proving 
non-consent, has meant that SV victims have been exposed to unnecessary trauma. In 
response, scholars like Brouwer (2005), have vehemently argued against such 
conceptualisations on the basis that they do not adequately capture the reality in which 
SV has occurred. In addition, some tribunal staff in the ICTR have engaged in hostile 
and insensitive treatment of SV victims, especially in regard to strategies of questioning 
and the collation of evidence. The findings reveal that the ICTR has also allowed for 
rape myths and sex-discriminatory views to permeate judicial proceedings, which have 
often remained unchallenged by the Chamber. This has proved problematic, as such 
practices have undermined the seriousness of SV, and worked to wrongfully shame and 
re-victimise SV victims who have testified (Askin, 2005). Moreover, the limits of the 
adversarial court system have denied women the opportunity to express their 
experiences in ‘their own words’, translating their suffering into the language of the 
law. Therefore, while the ICTR may have facilitated some recognition of SV victims, it 
has failed to build an organisational and cultural framework where SV has been 
appropriately addressed and rigorously prosecuted. The outcomes of cases tend to be the 
result of individual prosecutorial decision-making, rather than a structured response to 
SV. 
 
The analysis also reveals that the ICTR failed to adequately address concerns of 
representation.  In particular, the processes designed to provide support and protection 
of victims has been markedly limited, as treatment and protection schemes only address 
the needs of those included in the claims making process, and only benefit such 
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individuals during their stay at the Tribunal. The ICTR also failed to address 
redistributive concerns, meaning that most victims who have participated within the 
justice process have felt that the ICTR failed to offer them an adequate remedy. While 
recognition can be useful in restoring a victim’s dignity and acknowledging the harm 
caused, such a response seems superficial without the appropriate means required to 
address physical, psychological and socio-economic injustices connected to their 
suffering. 
 
To conclude, SV committed during conflict carries myriad functions, and has wide-
ranging and long suffered consequences for its victims. Therefore, it is important that 
international justice institutions work to respond to this issue, and consider the best way 
to promote justice that enables victims to overcome these injustices. As it stands, SV 
victims are now ‘on the radar’ of the UN. In recognising the gendered nature of SV 
committed in conflict (BDPA, 1995), the UN challenged the cultural acceptability of 
violence against women. Furthermore, the UN has begun to build a more progressive 
discourse towards this group through the development of IHL, which has significantly 
increased the opportunity for women to attain legal justice within international legal 
settings. However, this thesis affirms that there is still significant work to do, in terms of 
changing the cultural and operational nature of ICTs, in an effort to facilitate more just 
outcomes for SV victims. Strategies such as mandatory gender training, the appointment 
of specialised and experienced SV consultants, and strengthening protection and support 
units, are some measures that might be undertaken in an effort to encourage women’s 
equal recognition and representation. Furthermore, upon addressing the evident 
deficiencies that remain in international legal doctrines, ICTs can ensure that SV crimes 
are treated on a par with other rights violations, subsequently safe-guarding victims 
from further and unnecessary victimisation. However, more generalised efforts focused 
on addressing redistributive injustices, such as supporting SV victims in their plight for 
reparation, compensation and restitution, would benefit the immediate needs of those so 
greatly affected by systematic violence. 
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Appendix I: Sexual Violence Cases in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The table below lists all 43 completed cases, in alphabetical order, as of March 28
th
, 
2012. Of the 43 completed cases, 25 contain acts of SV committed against Rwandan 
women and girls. These cases (indicated by a *) formed the basis of this research. The 
table indicates how crimes of SV have been prosecuted in the ICTR. 
 
Key: 
 
G Genocide 
WC War Crime 
CAH Crimes against Humanity 
 
R = Rape 
I = Inhumane acts 
P = Persecution 
T = Torture 
Case Case Contains  
References to 
SV 
Outcome of 
Judgement Relative 
to SV Charges 
Outcome of 
Appeal Relative 
to SV Charges 
1. Akayesu * G+CAH (R, I) G+CAH (R, I) 
2. Bagilishema * ACQUITTED ACQUITTED 
3. Bagaragaza    
4. Bagosora, 
Kabiligi, 
Ntabakuze and 
Nsengiyumva 
* G+CAH (R, I, P)+WC G+CAH (R)+WC 
5. Bikindi * No charges laid 
concerning SV, but 
judgement contains 
references to SV 
 
6. Bisengimana * Plea-bargain: Rape 
charge subsequently 
withdrawn 
 
7. Gaa    
8. Gacumbitsi * G+CAH (R) G+CAH (R) 
9. Imanishimwe, 
Bagambiki and 
Ntagerura 
   
10. Kajelijeli * ACQUITTED SV charges not 
appealed 
11. Kalimanzira    
12. Kambanda    
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Case Case 
Contains  
References 
to SV 
Outcome of Judgement 
Relative to SV Charges 
Outcome of 
Appeal 
Relative to SV 
Charges 
13. Kamuhanda * ACQUITTED SV charges 
were not 
appealed 
14. Karera    
15. Kayishema and 
Ruzindana 
* No charges laid concerning 
SV, but judgement contains 
references to SV 
 
16. Mpambara * Indictment contained 
references to SV, but these 
were omitted from the 
judgement 
 
17. Mugenzi, Bizmungu, 
Bicamumpaka and 
Mugiraneza 
* ACQUITTED SV charges 
were not 
appealed 
18. Muhimana * G+CAH (R) G+CAH (R) 
19. Munyakazi    
20. Musema * G+CAH(R) ACQUITTED 
21. Nahimana, 
Barayagwiza and 
Ngeze 
* CAH (P) CAH (P) 
22. Nchamihigo    
23. Ndindabahizi * Charges withdrawn 
 
 
24. Niyitegeka * G+CAH (I) ACQUITTED 
25. Nsengimana * No charges laid concerning 
SV, but judgement contains 
references to SV 
 
26. Nshogoza    
27. Ntakirutimana, 
Gerard and 
Elizaphan 
* No charges laid concerning 
SV, but judgement contains 
references to SV  
 
28. Ntawukulilyayo    
29. Nzabirinda * Plea-bargain: Rape charge 
subsequently withdrawn 
 
30. Renzaho * G+CAH (R) ACQUITTED 
31. Rugambarara  * Plea-bargain: Rape charge 
subsequently withdrawn 
 
32. Ruggiu    
33. Rukondo * G ACQUITTED 
34. Rutaganda * G G 
35. Rutaganira    
36. Semanza * CAH (R, T) CAH (R, T), 
WC 
37. Seromba    
38. Serugendo    
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Case Case 
Contains 
References 
to SV 
Outcome of Judgement 
Relative to SV Charges 
Outcome of 
Appeal Relative 
to SV Charges 
39 Serushago * Plea-bargain: Rape charge 
subsequently withdrawn 
 
40. Setako    
41. Simba    
42. Rwamakuba    
43. Zigiranyirazo    
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Appendix II: Sexual Violence Cases Recognised in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
This Appendix identifies the 23 completed cases that contain references to SV 
committed against Rwandan women and girls. Although Ntakirutimana and Hormidas 
(identified in Appendix I) made references to SV, they were not included in this 
research. In these cases, SV was generally mentioned, with no specific connection to the 
defendant(s). 
 
The 23 cases included in this research are arranged in five categories: (i) cases where 
successful convictions have been entered for SV crimes; (ii) cases where SV 
convictions have been overturned on appeal; (iii) cases where individuals have been 
acquitted of SV charges; (iv) cases where SV charges have been dropped or 
subsequently withdrawn; and (v) other relevant cases. However, at times, these 
categories do overlap. For instance, where cases are included under the successful 
convictions category, some SV allegations have successfully contributed to the guilty 
verdict, while other allegations relative to SV charges have resulted in an acquittal.  
 
Key points: 
 Cases involve individuals, as well as multi-accused. 
 Those charged with SV mainly consist of national and local government leaders. 
However, media personnel [Nahimana et al.], civilians [Musema and 
Ruzindana], leaders of militia groups [Rutaganda, Serushago and Ngeze in 
Bagosora et al.] and a priest [Rukondo] also defended SV charges. 
 In some cases, SV charges have been incorporated by an amendment of an 
original indictment [Akayesu, Bagilishema, Bagosora et al., Mpambara, 
Musema, Ndindabahizi and Niyitegeka]. 
 Category (iv) pertaining to cases where SV charges have been dropped, or 
subsequently withdrawn, was included to demonstrate how prosecutorial 
decisions affect how crimes of SV are recognised. 
 This collation of case summaries is unique in the literature, particularly in terms 
of content and purpose. Due to word constraints, this research could not detail 
all instances of SV heard before the Chamber. Therefore, examples of SV have 
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been specifically chosen to give a varied overview of the allegations heard 
before the ICTR. The cases were organised in five categories, which were 
developed after I carefully recorded SV findings for each case. For other (dated 
and limited) summaries see, however, UN (2009: 46-57) and Brouwer (2005: 
493-498). 
 
I. Successful Sexual Violence Convictions 
1.  Akayesu  
Accused: Jean-Paul Akayesu 
 
Overview: Akayesu, the former Bourgmestre of the Taba commune, was convicted of 
genocide and crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, torture, rape and 
inhumane acts). 
 
SV evidence included numerous instances where Tutsi women and girls were subjected 
to SV and subsequently beaten and murdered in the Taba commune. The Chamber 
learned that while displaced civilians took refuge at the Bureau communal, 
Interahamwe and police regularly subjected women and girls to SV. One witness 
testified to having being taken from the cultural centre and into the forest, where she 
was raped by an Interahamwe armed with an axe and a long knife. She was later 
subjected to gang rape on the premises of the Bureau, with a group of approximately ten 
other girls and women, and raped on several other occasions. Another witness testified 
to having seen three women forced to undress, march and exercise naked by 
Interahamwe on Bureau premises. These acts were successfully charged as inhumane 
acts. Following these events, the women were then brutally raped, multiple times, by 
multiple assailants. One of these women, Alexia, was heavily pregnant, and 
subsequently went into premature labour whilst being raped. Later, the women were 
beaten to death with sticks. 
 
The Chamber found that Akayesu had “specifically ordered, instigated, aided and 
abetted these acts of SV”, by allowing such acts to take place on or near the Bureau 
premises, by being present during some acts, facilitating their commission through his 
words of encouragement, and because of his authority [Judgement: 67]. Akayesu was 
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the first case in international criminal law to recognise rape as a constituent crime of 
genocide. 
 
SV findings were upheld on appeal. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
2.  Bagosora et al. 
Accused: Theoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuzu and Anatole 
Nsengiyumva 
 
Overview: Bagosora was the directeur de cabinet of the Ministry of Defence; Kabiligi 
was the head of the Operation Bureau; Ntabakuzu was the commander of the elite Para 
Commando Battalion, and Nsengiyumva, was the commander of the Gsenyi 
Operational Sector. Kabiligi was acquitted on all charges, while the other three men 
were convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, persecution and 
inhumane acts) and war crimes. Bagosora was convicted of rape as a crime against 
humanity, as well as serious violations common to the Geneva Conventions (and 
Additional Protocol II). Bagosora and Nsengiyumva were also convicted of 
extermination as a crime against humanity. 
 
All four men were charged with rape as a crime against humanity and rape as a war 
crime. However, Kabiligi, Ntabakuzu and Nsengiyumva were acquitted on these 
charges, due to the failure of the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they 
were responsible either directly, or as superiors, for such acts. Bagosora was found 
guilty of rape, inhumane acts and persecution as crimes against humanity, and of 
outrages upon personal dignity relative to various instances of SV. The Chamber ruled 
that he was the highest authority in the Ministry of Defence and exercised effective 
control over the Rwandan Army. Therefore, he bore responsibility for their actions. 
 
The ‘organised’ killings involved the Rwandan Military who, at times, worked in 
conjunction with the Interahamwe and other militia. After the President was killed, 
roadblocks were set up throughout the city of Kigali. The Chamber confirmed that these 
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roadblocks became notorious sites for slaughter and SV, including sexual mutilation. 
Women were taken from the site of a Kigali roadblock to a nearby house by soldiers, 
where they were repeatedly raped over several weeks. The Chamber ruled that this was 
“consistent with the pattern of SV, which occurred in connection with roadblocks” 
[Judgement: 379]. 
 
It was confirmed by the Chamber that SV was perpetrated at the Gikondo Parish. The 
testimony of a UN peacekeeper was considered to accurately reflect the nature of the 
crimes. He recalled that: 
Pregnant women had their stomachs slashed open, foetuses on the floor. 
Even a foetus was smashed… I remember looking down, a woman had 
obviously tried to protect her baby. Somebody had rolled her off the baby. 
The baby was still alive and trying to feed on her breasts. She'd been... her 
clothes had been ripped off. The killing that was done was not done, in their 
opinion, to kill the people immediately; it had been done to kill them slowly. 
Women's breasts, women’s vaginas had been cut with machetes. 
[Judgement: 243] 
 
Furthermore, at the Saint Josephite Centre, many Tutsi women were forced to undress 
before being raped and murdered.  These forced ‘undressings’ were successfully 
charged as inhumane acts. The Chamber also found Bagosora criminally responsible for 
the rape and murder of the Prime Minister, where it was confirmed that she had a bottle 
inserted into her vagina. 
 
In addition to ruling that these acts constituted rape as a crime against humanity, the 
Chamber ruled that these acts constituted genocide. The Chamber stated that 
“considering the purpose of the roadblocks, the assailants intentionally killed Tutsis. 
The Chamber also finds that acts of rape, SV and mistreatment of the Tutsi’s there 
caused serious bodily and mental harm” [Judgement: 542]. 
 
On appeal, Bagosora’s conviction for inhumane acts as a crime against humanity (in 
relation to the sexual defilement of the Prime Minister) was overturned. However, all 
other SV findings were upheld. 
 
Sentences: Kabiligi was immediately released. However, the other three men were each 
sentenced to life imprisonment for their convictions. On appeal, all three men had their 
113 
 
sentences reduced: Bagosora to 35 years imprisonment, Nsengiyumva to 15 years 
imprisonment, and Ntabakuzu to 35 years imprisonment. 
 
3.  Gacumbitsi 
Accused: Sylvestre Gacumbitsi 
 
Overview: Gacumbitsi, the former Bourgmestre of the Rusomo commune, was 
convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination and rape). 
 
The Chamber held that Gacumbitsi had publicly instigated the rape of Tutsi women and 
girls, after discovering that he had driven around with a megaphone inciting Hutu men 
to rape and sexually degrade Tutsi women and girls. During these ‘announcements’ he 
claimed that women who resisted rape should be killed in an atrocious manner and have 
sticks placed in their genitals. The rape of Witness TAQ and seven other Tutsi women, 
ranging in age from 12 years to an “old lady”, were found to be a direct consequence of 
Gacumbitsi’s instigation. One of these women was quartered, after a stick had been 
pushed into her genitals, subsequently causing her death. 
 
In addition to establishing that these rapes constituted crimes against humanity, the 
Chamber found that they caused serious physical and mental harm to members of the 
Tutsi ethnic group, thus amounting to genocide. During trial, three accounts of rape 
were confirmed by the Chamber. However, Gacumbitsi was acquitted of these rapes 
upon the failure of the Prosecution to link him to these assaults. 
 
SV findings were upheld on appeal. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
4.  Muhimana 
Accused: Mikaeli Muhimana 
 
Overview: Muhimana, the former government conseiller of the Gishyita commune, was 
convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity (rape and murder). 
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The Chamber found that Muhimana had personally raped seven women: six Tutsi 
women and one Hutu woman. Muhimana was also found to have abetted in the 
commission of rapes by others, including soldiers and Interahamwe, in three separate 
instances. 
 
On one occasion he had taken two women back to his house and raped them. He then 
drove the women out of his house naked and invited Interahamwe to come and see 
“what naked Tutsi girls look like” [Judgement: 101]. Defence witnesses claimed that it 
was impossible in Rwandan culture to commit rape in the marital home. The Chamber 
did not accept this as evidence that these rapes had not occurred, and convicted 
Muhimana for these acts, ruling that they were consistent with the widespread and 
systematic attack against civilians. 
 
The Chamber also learned that Muhimana had disembowelled a pregnant woman using 
a machete, cutting her open from her breast to her vagina. He then removed her baby 
which cried sometime before dying. The Chamber ruled that this act could not be 
classified as rape despite submissions from the Prosecution. Although the act involved 
sexual organs, it did not, in the Chamber’s opinion, constitute a physical invasion of a 
sexual nature. These actions, however, were re-considered under the charge of murder. 
 
With regards to genocide, it was discovered that Muhimana had raped a Hutu girl 
because he believed she was Tutsi. However, after he discovered that she was Hutu, he 
apologised to her. The Court ruled that during such attacks, Muhimana had often 
referred to the Tutsi identity of his victims, and therefore concluded that his actions 
demonstrated his intent to destroy the Tutsi. 
 
On appeal, the Chamber's finding that Muhimana had raped two Tutsi women in his 
home was overturned. However, all other SV findings were upheld. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
 
 
115 
 
5.  Niyitegeka 
Accused: Eliezer Niyitegeka 
 
Overview: Niyitegeka, the former Minister of Information, was convicted of genocide, 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and 
crimes against humanity (murder, extermination and other inhumane acts). SV acts 
underpinned his conviction of inhumane acts and genocide. Niyitegeka was also 
charged with rape as a crime against humanity, although acquitted on this charge. 
 
During trial it was alleged that Niyitegeka had raped a young girl. One witness recalled 
how the 13-15 year old girl was taken by Niyitegeka to his vehicle. Although this 
witness did not see the rape, he stated that Niyitegeka had raped the girl and 
“subsequently threw her in front of the vehicle and shot her with a big gun” [Judgement: 
70]. While the Chamber ruled that the girl had been killed by Niyitegeka, there was 
insufficient evidence to rule that she had been raped, as the witness did not physically 
see the act. 
 
The Chamber also ruled that Niyitegeka ordered Interahamwe to undress the body of a 
dead Tutsi woman. He then ordered them to fetch and sharpen a piece of wood and 
insert it into her vagina, an act which was successfully prosecuted as an inhumane act. 
The Chamber also considered this act when ascertaining Niyetegeka’s intent to commit 
genocide, which helped confirm his intent “to destroy the Tutsi group” [Judgement: 96]. 
 
These findings were upheld on appeal. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
6.  Semanza 
Accused: Laurent Semanza 
 
Overview: Semanza, the former Bourgmestre of the Bicumbi commune, was convicted 
of complicity to commit genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination, rape, 
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torture and murder). On appeal, Semanza was also convicted of genocide and serious 
violations common to the Geneva Conventions (and Additional Protocol II). 
 
Several SV allegations were made against Semanza during trial. One witness told the 
court that she had learnt that women and girls were raped during an attack on a Gikoro 
Protestant church, a location where refugees had fled as a safe haven. However, she was 
not an eye witness to these events; therefore the hearsay nature of the evidence was not 
enough to sustain a rape allegation. 
 
The Chamber, however, did make SV findings concerning an incident where Semanza 
had directed a group of men to rape Tutsi women before killing them. The Chamber 
confirmed that Victim A was brutally raped, and her cousin, Victim B, was taken 
outside and killed by two other men. The Prosecution also alleged that Victim B was 
raped, however, insufficient evidence was provided to validate this charge. Nonetheless, 
the Chamber concluded that: 
By encouraging a crowd to rape women because of their ethnicity, Semanza 
was encouraging the crowd to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering for discriminatory purposes. Therefore, he was instigating not only 
rape, but rape for a discriminatory purpose, which legally constitutes torture. 
[Judgement: 147] 
 
Sentence: Semanza was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, which was increased to 35 
years on appeal. 
 
II. Sexual Violence Convictions Overturned on Appeal 
7.  Musema 
Accused: Alfred Musema 
 
Overview: Musema, a director of a tea factory, was convicted of genocide and crimes 
against humanity (extermination and rape). 
 
During trial, the Chamber heard how Musema had claimed that “those who wanted to 
have fun could rape the women and girls of the Tutsi without fearing any consequences” 
[Judgement: 125]. The rapes of many women were recounted in court, some of which 
Musema had committed personally. 
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The Chamber confirmed that Musema had raped a Tutsi woman named Nyiramusugi. 
Four other men had held her down while Musema undressed her. Before raping 
Nyiramusugi, he shouted “today the pride of the Tutsi ends” [Judgement: 235]. When 
Musema left the scene the other men took turns raping Nyiramusugi. The Chamber 
ruled that Musema’s actions were consistent with the pattern of widespread and 
systematic violence perpetrated against the civilian population.  Thus he was found 
criminally responsible for rape as a crime against humanity. In addition, the Chamber 
ruled that SV amounted to genocide, as these acts specifically contributed to the 
destruction of the Tutsi [Judgement: 255]. 
 
During trial, the Chamber also learned that Musema had ordered another Tutsi woman, 
Annunciata, to be raped by his subordinates, and her breast to be cut off and fed to her 
son. However, the Chamber ruled that there was inconclusive evidence to confirm that 
these acts had been carried out. 
 
On appeal, Musema’s conviction for rape as a crime against humanity, and 
subsequently genocide, was overturned in light of additional evidence that proved that 
there was reasonable doubt as to whether Nyiramusugi was raped. 
 
Sentence:  Life imprisonment 
 
8.  Renzaho 
Accused: Tharcisse Renzaho 
 
Overview: Renzaho, the former prefect of the Kigali-Ville Prefecture and colonel of the 
Rwandan Army, was convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity (murder and rape) 
and serious violations common to the Geneva Conventions (and Additional Protocol II). 
 
The Prosecution alleged that, throughout the Rugenge sector, Tutsi women and girls 
were raped by persons under Renzaho’s control, including members of the Rwandan 
Army and the Civil Defence Force, Interahamwe, civilian militias, urban police and 
administrative officials. In support of these allegations, Witness AWO testified that at a 
nearby orphanage refuge, Renzaho had arrived with Interahamwe dressed as soldiers 
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and told the refugees to leave due to over-crowding. After her return home, for a period 
of seven to eight weeks, AWO was raped on a daily basis. She was raped by 
Interahamwe, policemen and soldiers. She told the court that Renzaho said she could 
not be killed as she “was food for the militia men” [Judgement: 184]. Another witness, 
AWN, testified that she and her sister were brought to the Rugene sector office. Here, 
Renzaho stated that it was “time to show the Tutsi women that the Hutus are strong and 
can do whatever they wanted to do with them” [Judgement: 187]. For the next three to 
four weeks, AWN and her sister were repeatedly raped by officials and Interahamwe. 
 
The Chamber concluded that these rapes formed part of a widespread and systematic 
attack against the Tutsi, which caused serious mental and bodily harm, thus amounting 
to genocide. These acts were also successfully prosecuted as crimes against humanity 
(rape) and war crimes (outrages upon personal dignity). 
 
On appeal, the convictions successfully entered for rape as genocide, as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime were reversed, due to the indictment being rendered 
defective. The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Prosecution had failed to 
sufficiently plead that Renzaho had reason to know that rapes were committed in the 
indictment, which would have allowed him to better prepare for court. More 
specifically, Renzaho had not received clear or consistent notice of the “conduct by 
which he had reason to know of the rapes” [Appeal Judgement: 38]. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
9.  Rukondo 
Accused: Emmanual Rukondo 
 
Overview: Rukondo was a military chaplain in the Rwandan Army. He was convicted 
of genocide and crimes against humanity (murder and extermination). 
 
The Chamber confirmed that Rukondo had sexually assaulted a young Tutsi woman, 
Witness CHH. It was found that he locked her in a room and forced her onto the bed. 
He then forced himself on top of her and tried to spread her legs so he could have sex 
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with her, to which she resisted. He then gave up, but proceeded to caress and kiss her 
against her will, rubbing his body on top of her body until he ejaculated. 
 
The Chamber ruled that Witness CHH had “suffered serious mental harm as a 
consequence of Rukondo’s actions” [Judgement: 118]. After considering the wider 
context of the mass violence committed in the Gitarama prefecture, the Chamber 
concluded that Rukondo’s sexual assault constituted genocide. 
 
On appeal, however, the Chamber concluded that “the general context of mass violence 
cited by the Trial Chamber is insufficient to justify a finding of genocidal intent” 
[Appeal Judgement Summary: 8]. Thus the finding of genocide, with respect to this 
particular incident, was overturned. 
 
Sentence: Rukondo was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, which was decreased to 
23 years on appeal. 
 
III. Acquittals Concerning Sexual Violence 
10.  Bagilishema 
Accused: Ignace Bagilishema 
 
Overview: Bagilishema, the former Bourgmestre of the Mabanza commune, was 
charged with genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, 
extermination and other inhumane acts) and serious violations common to the Geneva 
Conventions (and Additional Protocol II). He was acquitted on all charges, the decisions 
of which were upheld on appeal. 
 
During trial very little was said about SV, except that Bagilishema had reason to know 
that outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment, 
such as rape, were being committed by his subordinates against Tutsi women in the 
Mabanza commune. 
 
Sentence: Bagilishema was immediately released following his acquittal. 
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11.  Kajelijeli 
Accused: Juvenal Kajelijeli 
 
Overview: Kajelijeli, the former Bourgmestre of the Mukingo commune, was convicted 
of genocide and extermination as crimes against humanity. With regard to SV, he was 
indicted for rape and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity, but acquitted on both 
charges. 
 
The Chamber found that many rapes had occurred within the Mukingo commune. One 
Tutsi victim recalled how three Interahamwe members had taken turns holding her 
down, while each of the men raped her. A fourth member then came over and threw a 
cigarette stub on her vagina and kicked her, which caused her to faint. Other incidents 
confirmed by the Chamber included the rape of a Tutsi woman named Joyce, and 
another woman named Nyiramburanga. Joyce was raped by Interahamwe, who then 
pierced her vagina with a spear, resulting in her death. Nyiramburanga was raped by a 
member of the Interahamwe, who then cut off her breast and licked it. 
 
The Chamber also heard the testimony of Witness GDO, who relayed evidence of the 
rape and murder of her 15 year old handicapped daughter. Both the witness and her 
daughter were hiding in a forest, when she overheard the Accused instruct the 
Interahamwe to rape and murder the women hiding in the bushes. Soon thereafter, they 
found her daughter, threw her on the ground, stripped her naked and raped her. The 
witness also testified to having being beaten and stripped naked herself, causing her to 
lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she discovered her murdered 
daughter, whose body was left positioned with her mouth open and her legs spread 
apart. A baby was screaming next to her dead body, as it lay in a pool of blood which 
came from her daughter’s vagina. 
 
Despite having confirmed that these rapes, along with others, had occurred throughout 
the Mukingo Commune, the Chamber ruled that the Prosecution had failed to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt that Kajelijeli “had either planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of” 
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them [Judgement: 200]. These decisions were not contested by the Prosecution in the 
Appeals Chamber. 
 
Sentence: Kajelijeli was sentenced to life imprisonment, which was later reduced to 45 
years on appeal. 
 
12.  Mugenzi et al. 
Accused: Justin Mugenzi, Casmir Bizmungu, Jerome-Clement Bicamumpaka and 
Prosper Mugiraneza. 
 
Overview: Mugenzi was the Minister of Commerce in the transitional government; 
Bizmungu was the Minister of Health; Bicamumpaka was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; and, Mugiraneza was the Minister of Civil Service. Bizmungu and 
Bicamumpaka were acquitted on all charges, while Mugiraneza and Mugenzi were 
found guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide and direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. 
 
The indictment included a range of SV charges made against the four men, including 
rape as a crime against humanity and as a serious violation common to the Geneva 
Conventions (and Additional Protocol II). However, the Chamber concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence against Bicamumpaka and Mugiraneza to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they were guilty of rape. Consequently, all men were acquitted 
mid-trial on these charges. 
 
Sentence: Mugenzi and Mugiraneza were sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, whereas 
Bicamumpaka and Bizmungu were immediately released following their acquittal. 
 
13.  Kamuhanda 
Accused: Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 
 
Overview: Kamuhanda, the former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Studies, 
was convicted of genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. With regard 
to SV, he was indicted for rape as a crime against humanity, but acquitted. 
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The evidence in support of SV referred to the attack on the Gikomero Compound. One 
witness, whom the Chamber regarded as credible, recalled how she saw girls being 
selected, and then taken from the Compound in a vehicle. After the events, the witness 
learned that the girls had been taken to a camp, where all but one were raped and 
murdered. Another witness, also deemed credible, recalled seeing women being taken 
away to be raped by their attackers. She did not personally witness the rapes, but had 
been told about them by her daughter and two of the victims. The Chamber ruled that 
the ‘hearsay’ nature of the evidence was not enough to sustain a rape charge against 
Kamuhanda. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
 
IV.  Withdrawal of Sexual Violence Charges  
14.  Bisengimana  
Accused: Paul Bisengimana 
 
Overview: Bisengimana was the former Bourgmestre of the Gikoro commune. An early 
indictment contained a charge of rape as a crime against humanity. However, this 
charge was later withdrawn after Bisengimana entered into a plea bargain, and plead 
guilty to crimes against humanity (murder and extermination). 
 
Sentence: 15 years imprisonment 
 
15.  Ndindabahizi 
Accused: Emmanuel Ndindabahizi 
 
Overview: Ndindabahizi, the former Minister of Finance, was convicted of genocide 
and crimes against humanity (murder and extermination). Ndindabahizi was initially 
charged with rape as a crime against humanity.  However, the Prosecution withdrew this 
charge before it went to trial. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
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16.  Nzabirinda  
Accused: Joseph Nzabirinda 
 
Overview: Nzabirinda was the former Youth Organiser of the Ngoma commune. He 
was an ICTR investigator until it was discovered that he had participated in the 
genocide. He had produced forged documents omitting his real name in order to secure 
his position. An early indictment against Nzabirinda charged him of rape as a crime 
against humanity. However, this charge was later withdrawn after Nzabirinda entered 
into a plea bargain, and plead guilty to murder as a crime against humanity. 
 
Sentence: Seven years imprisonment 
 
17.  Rugambarara 
Accused: Juvenal Rugambarara 
 
Overview: Rugambarara, the former Bourgmestre of the Bicumbi commune, was 
originally indicted for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, crimes against humanity (extermination, torture and 
rape) and serious violations common to the Geneva Conventions (and Additional 
Protocol II). However, the Prosecutor later amended the indictment to include only one 
charge, extermination as a crime against humanity, to which Rugambarara plead guilty. 
 
Sentence: 11 years imprisonment 
 
18. Serushago 
Accused: Omar Serushago 
 
Overview: Serushago, one of five leaders of the Interahamwe in Gisenyi, was initially 
indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, torture and 
rape). 
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With regard to SV, the indictment alleged that soldiers, militia and gendarmes “raped 
and sexually assaulted or committed crimes of a sexual nature against Tutsi women and 
girls, sometimes after having kidnapped them first” [Judgement: 11]. On one occasion, 
it was alleged that Serushago witnessed the rape of a Tutsi woman being perpetrated by 
one his subordinates, yet failed to prevent or stop it. 
 
Serushago plead guilty to all counts, except the charge of rape as a crime against 
humanity. The Prosecution later withdrew this charge. 
 
Sentence: 15 years imprisonment 
 
V. Other Relevant Cases 
19.  Bikindi 
Accused: Simon Bikindi 
 
Overview: Bikindi, who formerly worked for the Ministry of Youth, was convicted of 
incitement to commit genocide. While no charges were laid by the Prosecution 
concerning SV, the indictment noted that widespread and systematic SV was committed 
against Tutsi women in the Gisenyi prefecture, and Bikini knew, or had reason to know, 
that these acts were being committed by his subordinates. 
 
In support of these allegations, the Prosecution noted that a woman named Ancilla was 
taken away by two Interahamwe, under the orders of Bikindi, and raped and murdered. 
The Prosecution alleged that “Bikindi was aware or ought to have been aware of the 
acts of rape and SV committed against Ancilla” [Judgement: 85]. While the Chamber 
had no doubt that Ancilla was murdered during the genocide, it had serious reservations 
concerning the credibility of Witness AJZ and AJY who testified in support of this 
alleged crime. The Chamber later concluded that their evidence did not prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that Bikindi “had participated in the killing or rape of Ancilla” 
[Judgement: 87]. 
 
Sentence: 15 years imprisonment 
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20.  Kayishema and Ruzindana 
Accused: Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana 
 
Overview: Kayishema was the former Prefect of Kibuye, whereas Ruzindana was a 
local business man. Both defendants were found guilty of genocide: Kayishema on four 
counts, Ruzindana on one. 
 
No SV charges were made against either of the men. However, the Chamber made 
several findings concerning SV against civilians in its deliberations, although such acts 
were not linked to the defendants. Some witnesses recounted having seen Tutsi women 
being raped at roadblocks in Kibuye. One witness also relayed how his wife was gang 
raped by Interahamwe before their children. In its legal findings, the Chamber 
mentioned these incidents, and commented on many witnesses who were forced to 
watch their loved ones being raped, brutalised and killed in front of them. 
 
Sentence: Kayishema was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Ruzindana was 
sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. 
 
21.  Mpambara 
Accused: Jean Mpambara 
 
Overview: Mpambara, the former Bourgmestre of the Rukara Commune, was charged 
with genocide (or complicity) and extermination as a crime against humanity, but 
acquitted on all charges.  While no charges were laid by the Prosecution concerning SV, 
the indictment stated that Tutsi females were subjected to brutal acts of SV, as well as a 
Hutu woman who was married to a Tutsi, and carrying his child. The indictment alleged 
that Mpambara “should have known that SV was occurring, and that the perpetrators 
were his subordinates, subject to his authority and control, or acting under his orders or 
those of the other participants in the joint criminal enterprise” [Indictment: 6]. However, 
SV instances were omitted from the trial judgement. 
 
Sentence: Mpambara was immediately released following his acquittal. 
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22.  Nahimana et al. 
Accused: Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze 
 
Overview: Nahimana was one of the founding members of Radio Television Libre des 
Mille Collines (RTLM); Barayagwiza was a founding of member of the comite 
d’initiative for RTLM; and, Ngeze was a Rwandan journalist, founding member of 
Movement for Defence and a militia leader in the Gisenyi Prefecture. All men were 
convicted of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, incitement to commit genocide 
and crimes against humanity (persecution and extermination). On appeal, all were 
acquitted of conspiracy to commit genocide, and all genocide charges relating to their 
involvement with RTLM and Kangura respectively. The conviction of extermination as 
a crime against humanity was also reversed, as well as Barayagwiza’s conviction for 
incitement to commit genocide. 
 
Dubbed the “Media Case”, the three defendants were connected to the RTLM radio 
broadcasts or the Kangura publications which vehemently targeted the Tutsi. The 
Chamber learned that Tutsi women and girls were frequently raped and subject to other 
SV acts before being killed. One witness, for example, revealed that his pregnant sister 
was sexually violated with an umbrella, subsequently causing her death. The Chamber 
ruled that RTLM broadcasts and Kangura publications targeted Tutsi women for 
persecution, stating that: 
The portrayal of the Tutsi women as a femme fatale and the message that Tutsi 
women were seductive agents of the enemy was conveyed repeatedly by RTLM 
and Kangura…By defining Tutsi women in this way, RTLM and Kangura 
articulated a framework that made the sexual attack of the Tutsi women a 
foreseeable consequence. [Judgement: 353] 
 
However, no charges specifically pertaining to SV were laid against the men. Instead, 
SV findings were mentioned in the Chamber’s legal deliberations regarding Nahimana’s 
conviction for persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
Sentence: On appeal, Nahimana and Ngeze’s sentences of life imprisonment were 
reduced to 30 years imprisonment. In addition, Barayagwiza’s sentence was reduced 
from 35 years to 32 years imprisonment. 
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23.  Rutaganda 
Accused: Georges Rutaganda 
 
Overview: Rutaganda was a former youth militia leader who was convicted of genocide 
and crimes against humanity (murder and extermination). 
 
Although no SV charges were laid, the Chamber did making findings concerning SV. It 
discovered that refugees fleeing the Amarhoro Stadium were stopped by soldiers. The 
women and children were separated from the group and raped by Interahamwe. When 
the remaining refugees arrived at Nyanza, they were surrounded by Interahamwe and 
soldiers, who then proceeded to separate the Hutu from the Tutsi.  The Tutsi were then 
attacked and slaughtered. Those women and girls who had survived the previous attacks 
were put aside and raped before being murdered. The clothing of these women and girls 
was taken from their bodies. The Chamber ruled that Rutaganda directed and 
participated in attacks against the Tutsi, where Tutsi women and girls were raped. These 
findings were upheld on appeal. 
 
Sentence: Life imprisonment 
